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NOTES

Litigation Trusts in Chapter 11
Bankruptcies
A PROPOSAL TO ENSURE ADEQUATE
REPRESENTATION TO CREDITORS REPRESENTED
BY BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEES
INTRODUCTION
On December 10, 2008, Bernard L. Madoff’s Ponzi
scheme1 collapsed.2 On December 15, 2008, the Securities
Investors Protection Corporation (SIPC)3 obtained an order
pursuant to the Securities Investors Protection Act4 (SIPA)
placing Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities, LLC
(BLMIS) under the protection of SIPC and appointing Irving
Picard as trustee to liquidate the assets of BLMIS for the
benefit of its customers.5 In furtherance of his mission, Picard
filed four actions in the United States Bankruptcy Court for
1 “A ‘Ponzi scheme’ is [a] fraudulent investment scheme in which money
contributed by later investors generates artificially high dividends for the original
investors, whose example attracts even larger investments.” Official Comm. of Unsecured
Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340, 343 n.1 (3d Cir. 2001) quoting BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 1180 (7th ed. 1999).
2 SEC v. Madoff, No. 08-CV-10791, 2008 WL 5197070, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
11, 2008). Money invested with Madoff had been deposited into a single bank account
at J.P. Morgan Chase Manhattan Bank (JPM), which was used as a slush fund “solely
to enrich Madoff and his inner circle.” SEC v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec., LLC (In re
Madoff), 424 B.R. 122, 129 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010).
3 SIPC is a nonprofit corporation created pursuant to the Securities Investor
Protection Act that liquidates securities broker dealers when they are financially
troubled. A trustee returns investors’ cash and securities to them, and a fund exists to
compensate investors for their losses. Securities Investor Protection Corporation, SIPC
Mission, available at http://www.sipc.org/about-sipc/sipc-mission.
4 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa, 78eee (b)(3) (2012).
5 In re Madoff, 424 B.R. at 126; see also Picard v. JPMorgan Chase & Co. (In
re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC), 721 F.3d 54, 59 (2d Cir. 2013) (succinctly
describing the role of a SIPA trustee).
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the Southern District of New York6 alleging that “numerous
major financial institutions aided and abetted [Madoff’s] fraud,
collecting steep fees while ignoring blatant warning signs.”7
Picard accused these entities of enabling Madoff’s fraud by
funneling billions of dollars to him from new investors through
the creation of feeder funds, selling derivative products based
on BLMIS, and lending their “prestigious name[s] . . . to
legitimize and attract money to Madoff’s fraud.”8 The entities
were also accused of knowing or strongly suspecting Madoff’s
fraud yet continuing to funnel money to him to continue
collecting fee income.9
At first blush, the benefits of litigating such claims
would seem obvious. Former BLMIS customers could enjoy an
enhanced recovery, possibly up to the full amount of their
claims. SIPC could recoup some of the approximately $800
million it advanced to pay customer claims.10 Finally, the
lawsuit could not only provide a strong incentive for financial
institutions to distance themselves from or even report
suspected fraud but also satisfy a retributive urge felt toward
Madoff and his accomplices.11 It may therefore come as some
surprise to a casual observer to learn that almost all of the claims
asserted by Picard were dismissed for failure to state a claim.12
The two district court judges hearing the suits13 found that Picard
6 Under SIPA, once a brokerage firm is put into receivership and a trustee is
appointed, “the [district] court shall forthwith order the removal of the entire liquidation
proceeding to the court of the United States in the same judicial district having jurisdiction
over cases under [the Bankruptcy Code].” 15 U.S.C. § 78eee(b)(4). The Bankruptcy Court
then has “all of the jurisdiction, powers, and duties conferred by this chapter [on the district
court].” Id. Under FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(1), when proceedings are brought to recover
money or property, they are filed in the bankruptcy court and styled as an “adversary
proceeding,” which proceeds similarly to a lawsuit in a District Court. FED. R. BANKR. P.
7002 specifically incorporates a number of rules from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
7 In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 721 F.3d at 57. The suits were filed
“against JPMorgan Chase & Co., UBS AG, UniCredit Bank Austria AG, HSBC Bank
plc, and affiliated persons and entities.” Id. at 59.
8 Id. at 59-62 (citations omitted) (quotation marks omitted).
9 Id. at 59-62.
10 Id. at 58. Much like FDIC insurance, SIPC maintains a fund that is used to
pay the claims of customers who lost money in the failure of a broker-dealer, for a
maximum of $500,000 for securities and $250,000 for cash. 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-3(a).
11 See DIANA B. HENRIQUES, THE WIZARD OF LIES xx (2011) (describing Madoff’s
victims as feeling that he deserves to be imprisoned in something comparable to a
“Vietcong [sic] tiger cage;” see also Stephanie Strom, Elie Wiesel Levels Scorn at Madoff,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2009) http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/27/business/27madoff.html
(where Elie Wiesel believed that Madoff deserved to be kept in solitary confinement and
forced to watch a screen showing the faces of his victims for at least five years).
12 Picard v. HSBC Bank PLC, 454 B.R. 28 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011); Picard v.
JPMorgan Chase & Co., 460 B.R. 84, 90 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).
13 Picard’s suit against UBS, JPM, and other affiliated entities was heard by
Judge McMahon of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, see Picard v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 460 B.R. 84, while Picard’s suit against
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“lacked standing, under any theory, to assert [the claims],”14 and
the Second Circuit summarily affirmed the dismissals.15
The purpose of this note is to examine attempts by
bankruptcy trustees such as Picard16 who try to recover losses
suffered by a debtor’s creditors by imposing liability on third
parties that allegedly aided and abetted the debtor’s demise.
This issue has become increasingly important for three reasons.
First, unsecured creditors are often left with little to compensate
them for their losses. This is especially true in the case of
fraud.17 But even in more typical bankruptcy cases, most of the
debtor’s assets will be subject to claims by secured creditors.18
Trustees19 therefore look to deep-pocketed third parties, such as
attorneys, accountants, and bankers, who may have been
culpable for losses suffered by the debtor’s creditors.20
Second, while the scope of Madoff’s fraud may have
been unprecedented, the outcome of the litigation surrounding
Picard’s attempts to impose creditor losses on allegedly
culpable third parties is not. Typically, “a series of formalistic
bars prevents [a] trustee from going after . . . deep-pocketed
third parties . . . ”21 In particular, the doctrine of in pari delicto

HSBC and UniCredit Bank Austria was heard by Judge Rakoff of the same court, see
Picard v. HSBC Bank PLC, 454 B.R. at 28.
14 Trustee’s Seventh Interim Report for the Period Ending March 31, 2012 at
27; Picard v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, No. 08-01789 (BRL) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 25, 2012), ECF No. 4793; see also Picard v. HSBC Bank PLC, 454 B.R. at 37-38;
see also Picard v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 460 B.R. at 90 (concurring with Judge
Rakoff ’ s analysis of the suits).
15 Picard v. JPMorgan Chase & Co. (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC),
721 F.3d 54, 58, 77 (2d Cir. 2013).
16 Although Picard was a SIPA trustee, SIPA trustees have similar powers to
bankruptcy trustees. See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-1(a) (2012).
17 In the case of a collapsed Ponzi scheme such as Madoff ’ s, the schemer has
generally already squandered what was invested with him, either to lure in new
investors or on various extravagancies. See Nick Axelrod, Into the Perfect Storm: The
Failure of Trustee Actions Against Third Parties, 68 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 441,
442-43 (2012). Clawback suits against investors who withdrew more from the Ponzi
scheme than they deposited are common, though ultimately this only distributes the
losses among the investors rather than generating new funds to pay investor claims.
Amy J. Sepinwall, Righting Others’ Wrongs: A Critical Look at Clawbacks in MadoffType Ponzi Schemes and Other Frauds, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2012) (describing
such suits as taking from Peter to pay Paul).
18 Jo Ann J. Brighton, Secured Creditors Beware: The Latest Tool in the
Creditors’ Committee Toolbox, 23 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 36, 36 (2004); David Gray
Carlson, Security Interests in the Crucible of Voidable Preference Law, 1995 UNIV. ILL.
L. REV. 211, 213-14 (1995).
19 In a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case, a debtor will typically possess the powers
of a bankruptcy trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2012).
20 Andrew J. Morris, Clarifying the Authority of Litigation Trusts: Why PostConfirmation Trustees Cannot Assert Creditors’ Claims Against Third Parties, 20 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 589, 590 (2012).
21 Axelrod, supra note 17, at 443.
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prevents the bankruptcy trustee from bringing suit against
culpable third parties on behalf of the estate, while the Supreme
Court’s holding in the case of Caplin v. Marine Midland Bank
Trust Co. prevents the bankruptcy trustee from bringing suit on
behalf of the estate’s creditors. The result is that individual
creditors are left to their own devices.
Third, enterprising bankruptcy trustees have created ad
hoc solutions to bypass these formalistic bars to net a greater
recovery for aggrieved investors. Some trustees have
experimented with taking assignment of creditor claims against
third parties to get around the holding of Caplin. Others have
used the Chapter 11 plan confirmation process to engineer the
assignment of creditor claims to trusts or limited liability
companies, which in turn bring suit against culpable third
parties. This note will first describe reasons that litigation trusts
have come into being and then argue that in the brave new
world where bankruptcy trustees can represent estate creditors
in lawsuits against third parties, additional procedural
protections should exist for those creditors. As litigation trusts
are essentially class action lawsuits, this protection should be
derived from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which governs
class action litigation.
Part I of this note will provide a brief background on the
so-called “formalistic bars” mentioned above and describe how
they were applied in the Madoff case. Part II will explain,
drawing on Supreme Court precedent involving class action
litigation, why bankruptcy trustees such as Picard cannot
adequately represent estate creditors. Part III will describe
ways bankruptcy trustees have circumvented the bars
described in Part I and discuss them in the context of the
adequate representation issues discussed in Part II. Finally,
Part IV will argue that because litigation trusts bind nonparties to judgments, procedural protections must exist for
those non-parties, and will draw on Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 for suggestions.
I.

THE DOCTRINES UNDERPINNING THE DISMISSAL OF
BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEE SUITS AGAINST THIRD PARTIES

This Part of the note will describe the legal doctrines
that support the dismissal of claims by bankruptcy trustees
against culpable third parties generally and will discuss the
claims asserted by Picard in the Madoff proceedings in
particular. First, it will discuss the doctrine of in pari delicto,
which forbids a debtor, such as BLMIS, from suing those that

2014]

LITIGATION TRUSTS IN CHAPTER 11 BANKRUPTCIES

1661

aided and abetted it in fraud, and through that forbids the
trustee of such debtor’s bankruptcy estate from bringing these
claims.22 Second, it will describe the holding of Caplin v.
Marine Midland Grace Trust Co. of New York, which forbids a
trustee such as Picard from representing creditors of the estate
for which he is the trustee.23 Third, it will describe the holding
of Williams v. California 1st Bank, which forbids a trustee such
as Picard from taking assignment of creditor claims to evade
the holding of Caplin.24 Finally, it will describe the “Wagoner
Rule,” which provides that claims for defrauding a corporation
with the assistance of its management accrue to the
corporation’s creditors rather than the corporation.25
A.

The Doctrine of In Pari Delicto

The doctrine of in pari delicto is an abbreviation for the
Latin phrase in pari delicto potior est condition defendentis,
which means “in a case of equal or mutual fault . . . the position
of the [defending] party . . . is the better one.”26 The doctrine rests
on the idea that courts should not mediate disputes among
wrongdoers, and that their refusal to do so will deter wrongdoing.27
For example, if Madoff tried to sue one of his accomplices over the

See infra Part I.A.
See infra Part I.B.
24 See infra Part I.C.
25 See infra Part I.D.
26 Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 306 (1985).
27 Id. A simple (and perhaps entertaining) example of the application of this
doctrine arose in the case of Rose v. National Auction Group, Inc., 646 N.W.2d 455
(Mich. 2002). There, the plaintiffs owned an island in Lake Huron that they hoped to
sell for $850,000. Id. at 457-58. They signed an agreement with the defendant broker that
permitted the island to be sold at an auction with no guaranteed minimum selling price. Id.
at 458. To protect the plaintiffs in the event of a low price, the plaintiffs had the right to
withdraw the island prior to its sale. Id. At the auction, one of the plaintiffs became
concerned when only five bidders appeared, but when he inquired about withdrawing the
island from the auction, the defendant assured him that the price received would be
adequate because the defendant could insert a shill bidder to drive up the price. Id.
At the auction, bidding stalled at $175,000. Id. at 459. During a recess, the
plaintiff again had the option to withdraw the island from the auction, but instead
authorized the defendants to commence the shill bidding scheme. Id. “[W]hether
through bungling or yet more chicanery,” the shill did not bid, and the sale closed at
$175,000. Id. The plaintiffs filed suit against the auctioneers seeking reimbursement of
commissions and “damages to put them in the place they would have been had the shill
performed.” Id. The court refused to grant the plaintiffs relief over an arrangement
that unethically sought to impose a minimum price at an auction advertised as lacking
this feature. Id. at 467. Instead, the losses suffered by selling the island for $175,000
instead of the expected $850,000 in the scheme devised between the plaintiffs and the
defendants were left as they were. Id.
22

23
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proceeds of the Ponzi scheme, courts would refuse to help him and
let the losses fall where they may.28
The application of in pari delicto is rather obvious when
a lawsuit is between two individual wrongdoers. However, the
doctrine is extended in three important and less-obvious ways.
First, where an employee of an entity has engaged in wrongful
conduct, that employee’s misconduct will be imputed to that
entity.29 Therefore, BLMIS, a limited liability company, is
considered a wrongdoer simply because its managing member,
Bernard L. Madoff, was a wrongdoer.30 This is subject to only
narrow exceptions involving rogue employees.31
Second, because a bankruptcy trustee stands “in the
shoes of the bankrupt corporation,” he is subject to the same
limitations the debtor would face in litigation against a third
party.32 This notion arises out of 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1), which
provides that estate property consists of “all legal or equitable
interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of
the case.”33 If the debtor prior to filing for bankruptcy possessed
a cause of action subject to the in pari delicto defense, the

28 See Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., Inc.,
267 F.3d 340, 361 (3d Cir. 2001) (Cowen, C.J, dissenting) (summarizing the doctrine as
“a plaintiff who has participated in wrongdoing may not recover damages resulting
from the wrongdoing”) (citations omitted); Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941,
950 (N.Y. 2010) (“No court should be required to serve as paymaster of the wages of
crime, or referee between thieves. Therefore, the law will not extend its aid to either of
the parties or listen to their complaints against each other, but will leave them where
their own acts have placed them.”) (citations omitted); see also Picard v. JPMorgan
Chase & Co., 460 B.R. 84, 91-92 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (discussing how BLMIS cannot
pursue claims against JPM because of the doctrine).
29 Wight v. Bankamerica Corp., 219 F.3d 79, 86-87 (2d Cir. 2000). This was
also an underpinning of the holding in Wagoner; since the debtor did not have a claim
against Shearson, only the estate’s creditors held a claim. Shearson Lehman Hutton,
Inc. v. Wagoner, 944 F.2d 114, 120 (2d Cir. 1991).
30 Picard v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 460 B.R. at 91-92.
31 Where the agent is acting in his own interest and adversely to those of the
corporation, the agent is actually “committing a fraud for his own benefit, [and] is
acting outside of the scope of his agency, and it would therefore be most unjust to
charge the principal with knowledge of it.” The exception is narrow though and only
applies when the agent has “totally abandoned” the principal’s interests. Wight v.
Bankamerica Corp., 219 F.3d 79, 87 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
This exception is itself subject to an exception known as the “sole actor” doctrine.
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340, 359 (3d
Cir. 2001). “The general principle of the ‘sole actor’ exception provides that, if an agent
is the sole representative of a principal, then that agent’s fraudulent conduct is
imputable to the principal regardless of whether the agent’s conduct was adverse to the
principal’s interests. The rationale for this rule is that the sole agent has no one to
whom he can impart his knowledge, or from whom he can conceal it, and that the
corporation must bear the responsibility for allowing an agent to act without
accountability.” Id. (citations omitted).
32 In re Mediators, Inc., 105 F.3d 822, 825-26 (2d Cir. 1997).
33 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2012).
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bankruptcy estate has an identical interest in that claim.34 This
means that when in pari delicto would bar one person from
bringing claims against another, if that first person files for
bankruptcy, the bankruptcy trustee will likewise be barred.35
Thus, even though Picard himself was not in pari delicto with
any of the financial institution defendants, the defense still
applies to lawsuits he brings against such parties on behalf of
the estate of BLMIS.
Third, although in pari delicto is typically an
affirmative defense in state courts, under federal law it goes
further and deprives a trustee of standing to bring the claim at
all.36 As a result, when a corporation that has engaged in fraud
files for bankruptcy, the in pari delicto doctrine denies the
bankruptcy trustee standing to bring claims against those that
assisted the debtor in perpetrating the fraud.
In 2010, the New York Court of Appeals decided in one
opinion two consolidated cases dealing with the policy
implications of the doctrine of in pari delicto and the
imputation of fraud to a corporation. These cases arose out of
litigation involving losses suffered by Refco, Inc. and American
International Group, Inc. (AIG) due to misstatements on their
respective financial statements.37 In the Refco case, Refco filed
for bankruptcy, and a litigation trust vested with causes of
action “possessed by Refco prior to its bankruptcy filing” was
created to bring suit against Refco’s corporate insiders and
professional services firms, including investment banks,
accounting firms, and law firms, that were deemed complicit in
Refco’s collapse.38 In the AIG case, stockholders suing derivatively
brought a claim on behalf of AIG against its accountant alleging
that AIG “sold to other companies insurance policies that did not
34 Robert Bruner, The Collapse of the In Pari Delicto Defense to Bankruptcy
Trustee Claims: How the Fifth Circuit Has Opened a New Door for Trustee Litigation,
17 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 91, 98 (2011).
35 Picard v. HSBC Bank PLC, 454 B.R. 25, 29 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011). This
proposition has been heavily criticized but nonetheless endures. See generally Gerald
L. Baldwin, In Pari Delicto Should Not Bar a Trustee’s Recovery, 23 AM. BANKR. INST.
J. 8 (Oct. 2004); Jeffrey Davis, Ending the Nonsense: The In Pari Delicto Doctrine Has
Nothing To Do With What is § 541 Property of the Bankruptcy Estate, 21 EMORY
BANKR. DEV. J. 519 (2005) (criticizing the defense of in pari delicto and the holding of
Shearson Lehman Hutton v. Wagoner, 944 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1991)); Samuel C.
Wasserman, Note, Can the Trustee Recover? Imputation of Fraud to Bankruptcy
Trustees in Suits Against Third-Party Service Providers, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 365
(2008); see also Scholes v. Lehman, 56 F.3d 750, 754-55 (7th Cir. 1995), reh’g denied
(allowing a suit to proceed notwithstanding the in pari delicto doctrine as the
wrongdoer would not benefit from the suit in question).
36 Picard v. HSBC Bank PLC, 454 B.R. at 29 (citing Wagoner, 944 F.2d at 118).
37 Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 945, 948-50 (N.Y. 2010).
38 Id. at 946.
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involve the actual transfer of insurable risk, with the improper
purpose of helping those companies report better financial
results . . . resulting in serious harm to AIG.”39
In both cases, the plaintiffs urged the New York Court
of Appeals to create an exception to the principle that fraud
committed by corporate officers is imputed to the corporation
and thereby make claims by the corporation, either in a
derivative suit or by a litigation trust, susceptible to the in pari
delicto defense.40 The court noted that the “case reduces down
to whether, and under what circumstances . . . New York
common law [permits] corporations to shift responsibility for
their own agents’ misconduct to third parties.”41 The plaintiffs
alleged that where the beneficiaries of such suits are innocent
shareholders and creditors, and the goal of such suits is the
possibility of deterring third-party professionals in the future
from aiding and abetting misconduct or acting negligently, that
such suits should be permitted to proceed.42
The court rejected these arguments, however, and
upheld the imputation doctrine and the concomitant validity of
the in pari delicto defense for two reasons.43 First, the court
questioned why the interests of innocent stakeholders of the
corporations, here the creditors of Refco and the shareholders
of AIG, should “trump those [interests] of the innocent
stakeholders of the outside professionals who are the
defendants in these cases.”44 Put into the context of the Madoff
case, the court wondered why someone who purchased stock in
JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM) should have to pay the debts of a
person who invested money in BLMIS. This would create “a
double standard whereby the innocent stakeholders” of the
defendants “are held responsible for the sins of their errant
agents while the innocent stakeholders of the corporation itself
are not charged with knowledge of their wrongdoing agents.”45
Put again into the context of the Madoff case, why should the
shareholders of UBS AG (UBS), who elect a board of directors
that—through diverse means—hired bankers that set up feeder
funds to funnel money into BLMIS, pay the claims of those who
entrusted their money to Madoff, who then used their money to
39 Id. at 949. AIG is alleged to have suffered a $3.5 billion loss in stockholder
equity and to have been forced to pay $1.6 billion in fines. The accountant is alleged to
have failed to properly audit AIG. Id.
40 Id. at 954.
41 Id. at 957.
42 Id. at 957-58.
43 Id. at 958-59.
44 Id. at 958.
45 Id.
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pay the claims of old investors and lure new investors into the
scheme, while promising every investor a patently unrealistic
rate of return? This is especially true given that, in the dealings
between people like Madoff and third-party entities like UBS and
JPM, the scheme principal “almost invariably play[s] the
dominant role in the fraud and therefore [is] more culpable than
the outside professional’s agents who allegedly aided and abetted
the insiders or did not detect the fraud at all or soon enough.”46
Second, the court noted that permitting such claims to
go forward against the defendants might not “produce a
meaningful additional deterrent to professional misconduct or
malpractice.”47 The court cited Arthur Andersen, Enron’s former
accountant, as a counterexample to the proposition that the in
pari delicto defense offers third parties a “get-out-of-jail-free
card.”48 The court also cited settlements achieved in the Refco
and AIG cases under the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as examples of legislatively
crafted devices to impose liability on third parties.49 In short,
there was already reason for third parties to avoid aiding and
abetting others in fraud, and the judicial creation of yet another
avenue to heap liability onto these parties was not necessary.
B.

The Supreme Court’s Caplin Holding

One might think that it is immaterial whether a debtor,
through its bankruptcy trustee, could bring a claim against
those that aided and abetted the debtor in fraud as it is the
creditors of the debtor, or the customers of entities like BLMIS,
that stand to benefit from such suits. The trustee could simply
sue on behalf of these creditors, who were not in pari delicto
with the defendants, rather than the debtor itself and avoid the
entire issue. However, the Supreme Court’s holding in Caplin v.
Marine Midland Midland Trust Co. of New York prohibits this.
In Caplin, Webb & Knap (Webb), a corporation engaged
in real estate transactions, executed in 1954 an indenture with
Marine Midland Trust Company (Marine) providing for the
issuance of five percent debentures with a face value of
$8,607,600.50 To help ensure repayment, the indenture included
a covenant requiring Webb to maintain an asset to debt ratio of

46
47
48
49
50

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co. of N.Y., 406 U.S. 416, 417 (1972).
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at least two to one.51 Webb was also required to file an annual
certificate with Marine indicating compliance with all
provisions of the indenture, including the asset to debt ratio
covenant.52 In 1959, Webb began losing money, and in 1965 it
filed for relief under the Bankruptcy Act.53
The bankruptcy trustee commenced an investigation of
Webb’s affairs and discovered that Webb had been violating the
asset to debt ratio covenant for years54 and “Marine had either
willfully or negligently failed to fulfill its obligations under the
indenture.”55 The trustee alleged that Marine’s negligence
made it responsible for the losses suffered by the debenture
holders and filed suit on behalf of those creditors seeking to
recover from Marine the full amount of their unpaid claims.56
He further argued that because he already had a statutory
duty to investigate the debtor’s affairs and was overseen by the
court he was the ideal party to press the creditors’ claims.57
The Supreme Court forbade the trustee from bringing
the suit and pointed out three problems with the trustee’s
strategy. First, the relevant bankruptcy laws commanded the
trustee to investigate the affairs of the debtor and to pursue
causes of action available to the estate, but did not command or
authorize the pursuit of the causes of action of third parties,
such as the debenture holders’ right to sue Marine for
breaching its duty to them under the indenture.58
Second, a creditor’s claim against Marine would be the
difference between what that creditor was owed by the debtor
and what it received in distributions from the bankruptcy
estate.59 As that amount could not be determined until the
bankruptcy proceeding was in its advanced stages, the Court
did not see a reason for the trustee to represent the debenture
holders.60 By the time the estate made its final distribution, the
trustee’s job would be almost complete and the debenture
holders could select their own attorneys in the lawsuits they
Id. at 418.
Id.
53 Id.
54 The trustee discovered that Webb had assets of approximately $21 million
and liabilities of approximately $60 million, “plus [additional] contingent tax liabilities”
of almost $30 million. Id. at 419.
55 The trustee found that Webb breached the indenture from 1958 onward
and that its certifications were breached on “grossly overvalued appraisals” of Webb’s
real property holdings. Id.
56 Id. at 419-20.
57 Id. at 428.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 431.
60 Id.
51
52
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independently brought.61 Additionally, Marine might have a
claim to be subrogated to the debenture holders’ claims. This
would mean that Marine could seek to recover from the
bankruptcy estate whatever it paid out to debenture holders,
subject to the limitation that it would be paid nothing until other
creditors were paid in full.62 As a result, no benefit would accrue
from the litigation to the bankruptcy estate; every dollar that
came in from Marine to satisfy debenture holder claims would
create another dollar in claims against the estate in favor of
Marine.63 The net result would be a simple reprioritization of
claims between the debenture holders and Marine.64
Third, the trustee admitted that he lacked the ability to
bind debenture holders with any judgment he obtained.65 In
other words, while the trustee pursued his suit, nothing
prevented debenture holders from filing their own suits against
Marine for the same losses. Since the trustee and all the
individual debenture holders would be unlikely to “agree on the
amount of damages to seek, or even on the theory on which to
sue,” there was a substantial risk of inconsistent or duplicative
recoveries.66 The Court therefore concluded that “there is no
showing whatever that by giving [the trustee] standing to sue on
behalf of the debenture holders” that the amount of litigation
would be reduced.67 Instead, there was “every indication that
litigation would be increased, or at least complicated.”68
In language bordering on an advisory opinion, however,
the Court suggested that the holding “does not mean that it
would be unwise to confer such standing on trustees in
reorganizations” and noted that Congress could “well decide” to
do just that.69 In 1978, six years after the Caplin decision,
Congress passed the Bankruptcy Code.70 The House of
Id.
Id. at 430.
63 See id.
64 See id. Note though that since the estate almost certainly lacked the assets
to pay all claims in full, as there would be little reason for the trustee to file the lawsuit
or for Marine to contest it if this were not the case. Another way of characterizing the
result is the allocation of the debenture holders’ losses to Marine, a party arguably both
culpable for their losses and in a superior position to prevent such losses in future
cases. Certainly the investors who received payment of their claims in full rather than
a pro rata distribution from the estate would see the distinction between effecting and
not effecting the trustee’s plan.
65 Id. at 431-32.
66 Id. at 432.
67 Id. at 434.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 434.
70 Mixon v. Anderson (In re Ozark Restaurant Equipment Co.), 816 F.2d
1222, 1227 (8th Cir. 1987).
61
62
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Representatives considered legislation that would have expanded
the powers of bankruptcy trustees and overruled Caplin.71 But the
provision was deleted in a reconciliation of the House and Senate
versions of the Bankruptcy Code.72 As a result, “Caplin is still
good law and is the only Supreme Court case” that addresses the
issue of when a bankruptcy trustee has standing to assert causes
of action on behalf of the creditors of a bankruptcy estate.73
Caplin thus stands for the broad proposition that a
bankruptcy trustee can only litigate causes of action that
belong to the bankruptcy estate and whose benefit therefore
accrues to the estate as a whole.
C.

The Ninth Circuit’s Holding in Williams v. California
1st Bank

The holding of Caplin has been extended to forbid a
trustee from taking assignment of creditor claims in the hope of
undermining at least one of the justifications for the holding in
that case. In Williams v. California 1st Bank,74 the debtor ran a
business that both distributed Mexican seafood and offered
investment contracts with a 10% monthly rate of return.75 In
an unshocking turn of events, the debtor’s seafood/money
management business was actually a Ponzi scheme, and it was
forced into bankruptcy after the scheme collapsed in 1984.76
The bankruptcy trustee took a voluntary assignment from 111
of the creditors who had invested money with the debtors of
their claims against California 1st Bank (the Bank) for the
Bank’s role in aiding and abetting the debtor’s scheme.77 The
creditors that did not assign their claims would not participate
in any recovery from the action against the Bank.78
71 Id. at 1227 n.9 (citing H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 416-17 (1977)). The
provision would have permitted a trustee to bring a cause of action on behalf of
creditors or equity security holders if the trustee could not bring the case under any
other provision of the Bankruptcy Code, the recovery would reduce the creditor or
security holder’s claims against the estate, the suit would “not create an allowable
claim” in favor of the defendant against the estate, and the suit was “in the best
interest of the estate.”
72 Id. at 1228 n.10.
73 Id. at 1228.
74 859 F.2d 664 (9th Cir. 1988).
75 Id. at 665. Although hindsight is 20/20, it is hard to see how people were
not more wary of a fishmonger offering to double their money every eight months.
76 Id.
77 Id. The trustee “alleg[ed] state and federal securities law violations arising from
the Bank’s participation in, knowledge of, or approval of the debtor’s ‘Ponzi’ scheme.” Id.
78 Specifically, the trustee planned to use any recovery from the Bank to pay
administrative and priority claims of the bankruptcy estate, both of which are entitled
to a higher priority under the Chapter 7 distribution scheme than the claims of general
unsecured creditors. The trustee would then use the remaining funds to make a pro
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The Ninth Circuit rejected this proposition and held
that “Caplin and its progeny control this case” and “the mere
fact of assignment . . . [does not] . . . sufficiently distinguish[ ]
this case [from Caplin] to allow . . . a different result.”79 First, it
noted that the creditors were the true party in interest, and the
trustee could not bring suit for anything other than to collect
money owed to the estate.80 The creditors thus “assigned their
claims only for purposes of bringing suit.”81 Second, as in Caplin,
the defendant might have a claim of equitable subordination
against the estate, meaning that no benefit would accrue to the
estate from the trustee’s actions.82 Third, since the trustee did
not obtain assignment of all claims, there was a heightened risk
of inconsistent results between the assigned and unassigned
claims.83 Finally, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code in
1978, six years after Caplin was decided, and could have amended
the Code had it been displeased with the holding of Caplin.84 The
court interpreted congressional inaction as a sign of approval.85
Williams thus stands for the proposition that a trustee
cannot get around the holding of Caplin, which states that a
trustee can only litigate claims that belong to the estate by

rata distribution to assigning creditors. Further, the trustee would request that the
court forbid non-assigning creditors from receiving any funds from the funds recovered
from the Bank. Id.
79 Id. at 666.
80 Id. at 666-67.
81 Id. at 667.
82 Id. As in Caplin, the court ignored the fact that since the bankruptcy
estate likely lacked the funds to pay all creditors in full, this would have the effect of
imposing a disproportionate amount of the difference between the debtor’s assets and
its liabilities on the Bank. However, apparently assuming that the investors could
obtain judgments for both their losses and their costs in a state or federal court, the
court concluded that “the investors’ total judgments will not be affected by the ultimate
division of liability between the estate and [the Bank], it is as difficult here as it was in
Caplin to see ‘what advantage there is in giving [the trustee] standing to sue[.]’” Id.
(quoting Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co. of N.Y., 406 U.S. 416, 430 (1972)).
83 Id. The reasoning on this point has been criticized since “[t]he potential for
conflict between the trustee’s pursuit of the assigned claims and the pursuit of the
unassigned claims by the creditors who retained them is no greater than, and is
probably less than, the potential for such conflict that existed among all of the creditors
prior to the assignment.” Collins v. Kohlberg & Co. (In re Sw. Supermarkets, L.L.C.),
315 B.R. 565, 570 n.10 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2004). Since this explanation was given in
Caplin, “perhaps the Ninth Circuit felt itself bound by that rationale even if it made
little sense.” Id.
84 Williams v. Cal. 1st Bank, 859 F.2d 664, 667 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Mixon v.
Anderson (In re Ozark Restaurant Equipment Co.), 816 F.2d 1222, 1227 (8th Cir. 1987).
85 Williams, 859 F.2d at 667. The Eighth Circuit reached the same conclusion
in a similar case. In re Ozark Restaurant, 816 F.2d 1222 (where the trustee sought to
sue the directors and officers of the bankrupt corporation under § 544 of the
Bankruptcy Code, but the court reasoned that § 544 was not on point and Caplin forbid
any contrary holding).
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having the estate take assignment of those claims. It also stands
for the notion that even if trustees could take assignment of
creditor claims, they should not do so where they represent less
than all of the creditors with such claims.
D.

The Wagoner Rule

The scope of Caplin’s application has also been
enhanced by the Wagoner Rule, derived from the case of
Shearson Lehman Hutton v. Wagoner, which provides that
claims against a third party for defrauding a corporation with
the assistance of the corporation’s management accrue to the
corporation’s creditors, not to the corporation.86 In that case, an
individual named Herbert Kirschner formed a corporation to
engage in stock trades.87 He funded his investment activities by
having his corporation take out loans and issue notes to
members of his church.88 However, because he was neither
licensed nor registered as a broker or investment adviser, the
trades he made with these funds were illegal.89
Kirschner conducted his stock trades through accounts
his corporation opened with Shearson/American Express
(Shearson), and Shearson took a commission on each trade.90
Shearson became suspicious that Kirschner’s corporation was
illegally trading with borrowed funds, but took no action
following representations from Kirschner to the contrary.91
After Kirschner suffered significant losses in the stock market,
he put his company into bankruptcy.92 The bankruptcy trustee
filed suit against Shearson on behalf of the debtor alleging that
Shearson facilitated the corporation’s risky investments to earn
itself commissions and thus bore responsibility for those losses.
Although the logic behind Shearson’s liability was similar to
that of Marine’s in Caplin, here the trustee was suing on behalf
of the debtor rather than the debtor’s creditors.93

944 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1991).
Id. at 116.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Shearson even provided Kirschner with office space and a video monitor in
its building since he was deemed to be a trusted customer. Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 116-17.
93 Id. at 117-18. Although Shearson may have been unduly credulous with
Kirschner, the in pari delicto defense does not seem to be on point as this was not a
dispute between two wrongdoers. However, there remains some confusion as to the scope
of the Wagoner Rule as compared to the scope of the in pari delicto defense. See Kirschner
v. KPMG LLP, 15 N.Y.3d 446, 458, (2010); see also id. at 478 n.1 (Ciparick, J. dissenting).
86

87
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The court held that a claim against a third party for
defrauding a corporation with the assistance of the corporation’s
management accrues to the corporation’s creditors, not to the
corporation or its bankruptcy estate.94 As a result, under the socalled Wagoner Rule, even though Shearson’s actions caused harm
to the corporation by depleting its assets, only the corporation’s
creditors had standing to bring claims against Shearson.95 This
made it a case where the trustee was suing on behalf of the estate’s
creditors. Thus, the Caplin holding barred the claims.96
The Wagoner Rule has been applied to a wide variety of
conduct,97 and when a trustee files suit on behalf of a debtor,
the rule can be used by defendants as a means of “scor[ing] an
early knock-out by moving to dismiss . . . on the grounds that
the trustee, standing in the shoes of the . . . debtor, lacks
standing to sue on such claims.”98 As late as 2010, the New
York Court of Appeals applied the Wagoner Rule and reinforced
the proposition that trustees lack standing even if they are
assigned the claims by creditors.99
E.

The Application of These Doctrines in the Madoff Case

To make clear how these concepts operate, this section
will describe how they were applied in the Madoff proceedings.
As noted in the introduction, Irving Picard filed suits against
four large financial institutions and their affiliates100 alleging
that they knew of and were complicit in Madoff’s fraud, and
were thereby liable to BLMIS customers. This section will
describe the claims Picard made against three of these

Wagoner, 944 F.2d at 120.
In a more typical bankruptcy case, a bankruptcy trustee can sue for any
causes of action that the debtor possesses and such causes of action do not accrue to
another party. Id. at 118.
96 Id. at 119-20; Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Grumman Olson
Indus., Inc. v. H.I.G. Capital LLC (In re Grumman Olson Industries), 329 B.R. 411, 424
n.5 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (referring to Wagoner as the “Wagoner Rule” and
explaining that while quite similar to in pari delicto, the latter is an affirmative
defense while the Wagoner Rule is an issue of standing).
97 Thomas J. Hall & Janice A. Payne, Defenses to Claims by Bankruptcy Trustees
Against Lenders: The In Pari Delicto Defense and the “Wagoner Rule,” 123 BANKING L. J. 3,
9 (2006) (citations omitted) (citing negligence, negligent misrepresentation, breach of
fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting fraud/breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract,
and RICO as claims dismissed by citing Wagoner).
98 Id. at 4.
99 Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 947-49 (N.Y. 2010).
100 Picard v. JPMorgan Chase & Co. (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC),
721 F.3d 54, 59 (2d Cir. 2013) The financial institutions were JPMorgan Chase & Co.,
UBS AG, UniCredit Bank Austria AG, and HSBC Bank plc.
94

95
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financial institutions101 and how the legal concepts described in
Part I defeated the suits.
1. Claims Made Against JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A.
and Affiliates
J.P. Morgan Chase & Company and three affiliates102
were first accused of maintaining a checking account into
which Madoff deposited “hundreds of billions of dollars of
customer money,” paying JPM “an estimated half billion
dollars in fees, interest payments, and revenue . . . .”103 In his
complaint, Picard alleged dozens of reasons why JPM should
have determined from monitoring Madoff’s checking account
that Madoff was not running a legitimate investment advisory
business.104 These included “repeated transactions with the
same parties, often on the same days, with no obvious
purpose,” $84 billion transferred to just four customers, and
suspicious spikes in activity.105 JPM thus “had everything it
needed to unmask and stop [Madoff’s] fraud . . . .”106 In
addition, JPM was accused of enabling Madoff’s fraud by
selling approximately $250 million in structured products that
invested in BLMIS.107 JPM also extended approximately $145
million in credit to BLMIS.108

101 A discussion of the suit against UniCredit S.p.A. was omitted as the facts
are substantially similar to those in the UBS and HSBC suits.
102 These three affiliates were JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., J.P. Morgan Securities
LLC, and J.P. Morgan Securities Ltd. Picard v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 721 F.3d at 59 n.4.
103 Id. at 59-60.
104 Amended Complaint at 53-77, Picard v. JPMorgan Chase & Co, 460 B.R.
84 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 11-cv-00913-CM) (hereinafter “JPM Complaint”).
105 Id. at 71.
106 Id. at 2; see also Picard v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 721 F.3d at 60. Picard’s
complaint also details a multitude of examples where JPM personnel were either
discussing or performing due diligence on BLMIS and mentioned the strong possibility
that Madoff was a fraud. See, e.g., JPM Complaint at 33-36 (discussing concerns that
arose while JPM assessed the risks surrounding structured products that invested in
BLMIS). Picard’s complaint also details various regulatory measures to prevent fraud
and money laundering that JPM violated in connection with Madoff ’ s bank account.
See, e.g., JPM Complaint at 61-62 (discussing how JPM ignored irregularities in
reports BLMIS filed with the SEC).
107 JPM Complaint at 121. In a structured product, an investor would put up a
sum of money, say $100, while JPM would lend them additional money to leverage this
initial investment, say $200, and the total would be invested in BLMIS. The return on
the investment is split between the bank and the investor. The investor gets a return
on his investment based on a multiple of his initial investment (e.g. 6% of $300 rather
than $100), while the bank gets fee and interest income and the returns above and
beyond what the investor has contracted to receive (e.g. the investor contracted for 6%
but BLMIS pays out 9.5%). Id. at 29.
108 Id. at 78-81. Given that a Ponzi scheme should not have much by way of
operating expenses, one could presume that this money was used to fund redemptions
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Although Picard filed suit against JPM for 28 causes of
action, the first 20 were for preferential and fraudulent
transfers under §§ 544, 547, and 548 of the Bankruptcy Code.109
The heart of Picard’s complaint are six of the final causes of
action, which sought damages under state common law for (1)
knowing participation in a breach of trust, (2) aiding and
abetting fraud, (3) aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty,
(4) conversion, (5) aiding and abetting conversion, and (6) fraud
on the regulator.110 These causes of action alleged that JPM
either knew or was willfully blind to Madoff’s fraud and its
failure to take action “proximately caused the fraud that
resulted in billions in damages to customers, creditors, and/or
BLMIS.”111 In particular, Picard alleged in the conversion claim
that all money Madoff deposited into the JPM bank account,
which was “[f]rom 1986 on, all of the money that Madoff stole
from his customers,”112 was converted and JPM was liable both for
this conversion and for aiding and abetting same.113 In total, the
trustee sought $19 billion in damages for these causes of action.114
2. Claims Made Against UBS AG and Affiliates
Two hedge funds known as Luxalpha SICAV and
Groupement Financer Ltd. together invested approximately $2
billion with BLMIS.115 UBS AG and three affiliates116 served as
“sponsor, manager, administrator, custodian, and primary
banker” for these two funds.117 Although this would have
typically involved imposing substantial responsibilities on UBS,
in actuality UBS simply outsourced all of these responsibilities

by customers. Had the credit not been extended, Madoff may have been forced to
confess his fraud at an earlier date.
109 Id. at iii-v.
110 Id. at v.
111 Id. at 118 (discussing the aiding and abetting fraud claim); see also id. at
122-26 (discussing the aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty claim); id. at 132-38
(discussing the same for the fraud on the regulator claim).
112 Id. at 2.
113 Id. at 127.
114 Id. at 145. Note that given the theory of the conversion claim, that JP
Morgan converted all money invested with Madoff, it could be liable for all money lost
by investors in the scheme.
115 Complaint at 77, Picard v. JPMorgan Chase & Co, 460 B.R. 84 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 11-cv-04212-CM) (hereinafter the “UBS Complaint”).
116 The four entities were UBS AG, UBS (Luxembourg) S.A., UBS Fund Services
(Luxembourg) S.A., and UBS Third Party Mgmt. Co. S.A. Picard v. JPMorgan Chase & Co.
(In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC), 721 F.3d 54, 60 n.6 (2d Cir. 2013).
117 Id. at 60.
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to Madoff.118 By acting in these roles, UBS “enabled and
perpetuated the Madoff fraud by effectively selling the UBS
brand and reputation to Luxalpha and Groupement Financier in
order to provide those funds with the appearance of
legitimacy.”119 Because UBS’s prior research repeatedly revealed
significant issues with BLMIS,120 specifically including fears that
Madoff was running a Ponzi scheme,121 Picard alleged UBS took
on these roles to earn fees122 and because it protected itself
through various indemnity agreements.123
As with JPM, the trustee alleged a multitude of claims,
many of which were for preferential or fraudulent transfers
under the Bankruptcy Code.124 However, the most important
claims against UBS were for (1) aiding and abetting fraud, (2)
aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, (3) aiding and
abetting conversion, (4) conversion, and (5) knowing participation
in a breach of trust.125 Because of UBS’s role, Picard alleged that
it was “a proximate cause of the fraud,” and caused billions in
losses to BLMIS’s customers and creditors.126 Picard sought at
least $2 billion in damages.127
3. Claims Made Against HSBC Bank plc and Affiliates
HSBC Bank plc and 12 affiliates128 were accused of
“direct[ing] over $8.9 billion into BLMIS’s fraudulent
investment advisory business” through “a labyrinth of hedge

118 UBS Complaint supra note 115, at 40-58. For example, the custodian of a
fund is “responsible for both the safekeeping of the fund’s assets and the supervision of
the fund.” Id. at 42. UBS delegated this to BLMIS. Id. Similarly, a portfolio manager
“assume[s] the responsibility for the active management of the fund’s assets,” but UBS
also delegated this task to BLMIS. Id.
119 Id. at 44.
120 See id. at 32-40.
121 See, e.g., id. at 2, 36-37. The UBS Complaint notes that at all times, UBS
refused to market funds that invested in BLMIS to its own clients. Id. at 2, 32.
122 UBS is estimated to have made approximately $80 million in fees for the
work it performed, or did not perform, as it were, for the two funds. Id. at 1.
123 Id. at 45.
124 Id. at iii-iv.
125 Id. at iv.
126 Id. at 94, 97, 100, 103.
127 Id. at 122.
128 The affiliates are HSBC Bank plc, HSBC Holdings plc, HSBC Securities
Services (Luxembourg) S.A., HSBC Institutional Trust Services (Ireland) Limited,
HSBC Securities Services (Ireland) Limited, HSBC Institutional Trust Services
(Bermuda) Limited, HSBC Bank USA, N.A., HSBC Securities Services (Bermuda)
Limited, HSBC Bank (Cayman) Limited, HSBC Private Banking Holdings (Suisse)
S.A., HSBC Private Bank (Suisse) S.A., HSBC Fund Services (Luxembourg) S.A., and
HSBC Bank Bermuda Limited. Picard v. JPMorgan Chase & Co. (In re Bernard L.
Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC), 721 F.3d 54, 61 n.8 (2d Cir. 2013).
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funds, management companies, and service providers.”129 As
with UBS, HSBC was accused of lending its name and
reputation to the hedge funds that fed money to Madoff,
providing them with “an air of legitimacy.”130 As with UBS,
HSBC was accused of knowing or being willfully blind at all
times to the fact that BLMIS was not a legitimate investment
business.131 However, unlike UBS, HSBC was accused of
pushing funds that it invested with Madoff on its own clients.132
Picard pursued a variety of claims, but the most important
ones were for aiding and abetting fraud and aiding and
abetting breach of fiduciary duty.133 Picard requested $6.6
billion in damages against HSBC for these claims.134
4. The Dismissal of Picard’s Claims against JPM, UBS,
and HSBC
As of late 2013, Picard has only collected approximately
$9.5 billion of BLMIS customers’ $20 billion in principal
losses,135 and many of those customers likely hope he can make
good on their approximately $67 billion in paper losses.136 The
ability to pursue over $20 billion in claims against three large
financial institutions was too good an opportunity to pass up.
However, the legal doctrines discussed in Part I made these
otherwise valuable claims unviable.
In the first decision issued in these matters, which
involved the suit against HSBC, UniCredit S.p.A., and their
affiliates,137 the presiding judge, Jed Rakoff, concluded that
“the federal Bankruptcy Code . . . does not itself confer
standing on a bankruptcy trustee to assert claims against third

129 Complaint, at 9-10, Picard v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, No. 0901364 (BRL) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2012) (hereinafter the HSBC Complaint).
130 Id. at 93.
131 See id. at 52-84.
132 Id. at 107-10.
133 Id. at iii-iv.
134 Picard v. JPMorgan Chase & Co. (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC),
721 F.3d 54, 62 (2d Cir. 2013).
135 Trustee’s Tenth Interim Report for the Period Ending Sept. 30, 2013 at 5,
Picard v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, No. 08-01789 (BRL) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct.
30, 2013), ECF No. 5554 [hereinafter Interim Report].
136 Picard’s clawback suits against investors who withdrew more than they
deposited with BLMIS have also been extremely controversial. See Anthony Martucci,
Advocating for Asset Forfeiture in the Post-Madoff Era: Why the Government, Not a
Bankruptcy Trustee, Should Be Responsible for Recovering and Redistributing Assets
From Feeder Funds and Net Winners, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 599, 605-07 (2012).
137 In addition to various feeder fund defendants, UniCredit S.p.A. was
accused of funneling $2 billion into BLMIS. Picard v. HSBC Bank plc, 454 B.R. 25, 28
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).
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parties on behalf of the estate’s creditors.”138 This meant that
pursuant to the holding of Caplin, Picard was barred at the
outset from bringing any claims that did not belong to
BLMIS.139 In the next paragraph, the court noted that “a
bankruptcy trustee is often barred from bringing claims on
behalf of the debtor’s estate because of the common law
doctrine of in pari delicto, which generally precludes a
wrongdoer like [BLMIS] from recovering from another
wrongdoer.”140 Because of “these two obstacles,”141 which
forbade Picard from suing either on behalf of the estate or on
behalf of anyone else, including BLMIS’s creditors, Picard was
forced to find another legal argument to press these claims.
Those tried, which are beyond the scope of this note but were
rooted in the text of SIPA, were unsuccessful.142
Similarly, in the second opinion issued, which involved
the suits against JPM and UBS, Judge Colleen McMahon noted
that Caplin and the in pari delicto doctrine barred the trustee’s
claims.143 Picard’s remaining arguments were either “mere
reformulations of those already rejected by Judge Rakoff”144 or
were otherwise rejected.145 Resultantly, the court dismissed the
common law claims against JPM and UBS.146
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed both decisions.147
It noted that claims on behalf of BLMIS were “barred by the
doctrine of in pari delicto.”148 It then noted that under the
Wagoner Rule, any claims BLMIS had accrued to BLMIS’s
creditors.149 Turning to whether Picard could “assert . . . claims
on behalf of BLMIS’s [creditors],” it noted that Caplin and its
progeny control.150 In short, because of the above described
Id. at 29 (citations omitted).
Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Picard first argued that he was a “bailee of the property of Madoff
Securities’ customers.” Id. Picard then argued that he had “standing to bring these
claims . . . as enforcer of SIPC’s subrogation rights.” Id. at 33. Neither argument was
successful and all of the common law claims were dismissed. Id. at 38.
143 Picard v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 460 B.R. 84, 91 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).
144 Id. at 92.
145 The trustee argued that 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) gave him the authority to press
these claims, but the court rejected this argument as this interpretation of the statute
“would undermine the limitations on trustee standing established by Caplin and
enforced by courts in this and other circuits for nearly forty years.” Id.
146 Id. at 106.
147 Picard v. JPMorgan Chase & Co. (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC),
721 F.3d 54, 58 (2d Cir. 2013).
148 Id. at 63.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 66, 67. The court further noted that nothing in either SIPA or the
Bankruptcy Code made this case a special situation. Id. at 67-77 (discussing the
138

139
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doctrines, Picard could not press any claims against the financial
institution defendants for the losses they allegedly inflicted or
helped to inflict on customers of BLMIS. Although these customers
could bring their own suits against the financial institution
defendants,151 because Picard has already recovered “more than
54% of the currently estimated principal lost in [Madoff’s] Ponzi
scheme,”152 such individual customers may not have sufficiently
large damages to make these suits worth pursuing.
II.

AN ANALYSIS OF BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEES AND ADEQUATE
REPRESENTATION OF ESTATE CREDITORS

At this point, one might think that all that is standing
in the way of a full recovery for creditors in the position of
BLMIS customers is the doctrine of in pari delicto and the
holding of Caplin. However, this section will argue that as the
Bankruptcy Code is currently constructed, even if a judge were
willing to lift either or both of these bars, trustees such as
Picard should nonetheless not be permitted to proceed, as there
is no way these trustees could provide creditors with adequate
representation. Specifically, an analysis of the law surrounding
class action litigation and the representation of non-parties to a
suit demonstrates that trustees who brought suits currently
barred by Caplin would be forced to unfairly distribute the
proceeds of any judgments obtained.
A.

The Due Process Clause Requirements to Bind NonParties to Litigation

“It is a principle of general application in AngloAmerican jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment in
personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a
party or to which he has not been made a party by service of
process.”153 The enforcement of a judgment against a person
who was not a party to litigation violates the due process

application of Redington v. Touche Ross & Co., 592 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1978), Picard’s
theory under § 544 and St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. PepsiCo., Inc., 884 F.2d 688
(2d Cir. 1989), Picard’s bailment theory, and his theory on standing as the
representative of SIPC as subrogee). A discussion of these theories would be beyond the
scope of this note even if the Second Circuit had not rejected each one as invalid.
151 Id. at 76 n.29.
152 Interim Report, supra note 135, at 5.
153 Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940) (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95
U.S. 714 (1878)).

1678

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:4

clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.154 In 2008,
the Supreme Court explicated in the case of Taylor v. Sturgell
the six exceptions to this concept.155
First, non-parties may agree “to be bound by the
determination of issues in an action between others.”156 For
example, where a defendant faces identical claims from
numerous plaintiffs, one plaintiff may file a “test case,” and
other plaintiffs “may agree that the question of the defendant’s
liability will be definitely determined” in that proceeding.157
Second, non-parties may be bound by “pre-existing ‘substantive
legal relationship[s],’” such as “preceding and succeeding
owners of property, bailee and bailor, and assignee and
assignor.”158 Third, “in certain limited circumstances, a
nonparty may be bound by a judgment because she was
adequately represented by someone with the same interests
who was a party to the suit.”159 This includes class actions and
“suits brought by trustees, guardians, and other fiduciaries.”160
Fourth, a non-party may be “bound by a judgment if [it]
assume[d] control over the litigation in which [a] judgment was
rendered.”161 Fifth, a non-party may be bound where it brings suit
by proxy, either through a representative or an agent.162 Sixth, “in
certain circumstances a special statutory scheme,” such as
“bankruptcy and probate proceedings” may bind non-parties “if
the scheme is otherwise consistent with due process.”163
A bankruptcy trustee authorized to bring suit on behalf
of estate creditors, notwithstanding the holding of Caplin,
could only do so under the sixth category, pursuant to
bankruptcy’s status as a special statutory scheme, or the third
category, a suit by a party with the same interests.164 However,
Id. at 41 (citations omitted).
Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 893 (2008). In Taylor, the petitioner had
filed a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit “seeking certain documents from the
Federal Aviation Administration.” A friend of his had previously filed a similar lawsuit
seeking the same documents, but the suit was unsuccessful. The lower courts had held
that the petitioner was bound by the judgment entered in the prior lawsuit, but the
Supreme Court reversed, holding that absent one of the explicated categories of
representation, a prior judgment cannot bind a party. Id. at 885-87.
156 Id. at 893 (citations omitted).
157 Id. (citations omitted).
158 Id. at 894 (citations omitted).
159 Id. (citations omitted) (quotation marks omitted) (brackets omitted).
160 Id. (citations omitted).
161 Id. at 895 (quoting Montana v. U.S., 440 U.S. 147, 154 (1979)).
162 Id.
163 Id. (citations omitted).
164 A trustee would not be bringing a test case under the first category, there
is no pre-existing substantive relationship under the second category, the creditor
would not be assuming control over the suit under the fourth category, and it would not
be a suit by proxy under the fifth category.
154
155
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if and until the Bankruptcy Code provides explicit
authorization for a trustee to file suits on behalf of estate
creditors,165 the trustee is only acting under the third category.
Thus, for the trustee to bring suit on behalf of estate creditors,
he must provide those creditors with adequate representation
as defined by case law on the issue.166
Adequate representation requires that “the original
plaintiffs [understand] themselves to be acting in a
representative capacity and that there [are] . . . special
procedures to safeguard the interests of absentees.”167 So for
example, in Taylor v. Sturgell the Supreme Court rejected the
concept of “virtual representation”168 for, inter alia, finding that
a party’s representation of the interests of a non-party is not
adequate if, at a minimum, their interests are not aligned and
the non-party’s interests are not protected.169 The Court further
noted that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 safeguards
adequate representation in the context of class action
litigation.170 This is meant to ensure that a non-party receives
due process. Resultantly, case law on class actions could be
especially informative in determining what it would take for a
bankruptcy trustee to adequately represent estate creditors in
a suit against culpable third parties.
B.

Adequate Representation in the Context of Class Actions

The Supreme Court’s most recent case on class actions,
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,171 provides the best starting
point. In Dukes, three women who had worked for Wal-Mart at
various stores throughout the U.S were serving as the lead
plaintiffs for a class of 1.5 million female employees alleged to
have been denied equal pay or promotions on account of their

165 See Mixon v. Anderson (In re Ozark Restaurant Equipment Co.), 816 F.2d
1222, 1227 (8th Cir. 1987).
166 Taylor, 553 U.S. at 894-95 (citations omitted).
167 Id. at 897-98 (citing S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Alabama, 526 U.S. 160 (1999)).
168 For virtual representation to be permissible, the party must meet a seven
factor test which requires a showing that a non-party had (1) an “identity of interest”
with the party; (2) a “close relationship” with the bound party; (3) participated “in prior
litigation by the party”; (4) gained the party’s “apparent acquiescence”; (5) deliberately
“maneuver[ed] to avoid the effect of [a] judgment”; (6) “adequate representation”; and
(7) “a suit raising ‘public law’ rather than ‘private law.’” Id. at 888 (quoting Tyus v.
Schoemehl, 93 F.3d 449 (1996)). Other Circuits had applied their own inconsistent
tests and decisions. Id. at 895.
169 Id. at 900 (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 43 (1940)).
170 Id. at 900-01.
171 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).

1680

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:4

sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.172 The lead
plaintiffs claimed that the harm they suffered was “common to
all Wal-Mart’s female employees.”173
The Supreme Court noted that the crucial issue in the
case was commonality under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(a)(2), which requires “a plaintiff to show that ‘there are
questions of law or fact common to the class.’”174 The Court
noted that “any competently crafted class complaint” can raise
common questions.175 Commonality instead requires a showing
that all class members “have suffered the same injury.”176 This
demonstrates “that all of their claims can productively be
litigated at once.”177 A showing that all plaintiffs “suffered a
violation of the same provision of the law” does not make this
showing.178 Instead, a class must be able to “generate common
answers . . . to drive the resolution of the litigation.”179 In suing
over “millions of employment decisions at once,” the plaintiffs
would need to demonstrate “some glue holding the alleged
reasons for all these decisions together” which would produce
“a common answer to the crucial question [of] why was [each
individual plaintiff] disfavored.”180
The plaintiffs were unable to identify a company-wide
policy or single means by which each of them had suffered

172 Id. at 2547-48 (one plaintiff claimed to have been demoted and fired in
retaliation for invoking internal complaint procedures claiming discrepant treatment
from male employees; another claimed to have been frequently disciplined and told to
work on her physical appearance; a third claimed to have been denied opportunities to
train for management positions).
173 Id. at 2548.
174 Id. at 2550-51 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2)). Before the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California, the plaintiffs had put forth
“statistical evidence about pay and promotion disparities between men and women” at
Wal-Mart, anecdotal reports of sexual discrimination from about 120 female employees,
and sociological testimony from an expert witness that found a company culture
“vulnerable to gender discrimination.” Id. at 2549. The District Court certified the class
and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 2549-50.
175 Id. at 2551. As examples, the court noted that all plaintiffs worked for WalMart, all Wal-Mart managers had discretion over pay, and discriminating against
women is an unlawful practice. Id.
176 Id. (quoting Gen. Telephone Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 (1982)).
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id. (quoting Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of
Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 131-32 (2009)). To do so, the court would want
“some glue holding the alleged reasons for those decisions.”
180 Id. at 2552 (emphasis omitted). Since Wal-Mart had an announced policy
forbidding sexual discrimination and punished denials of equal opportunity, the
plaintiffs had to rely on the expert testimony about Wal-Mart’s corporate culture to
show a policy of discrimination. Id. at 2553. Although the expert testified that WalMart’s culture was vulnerable to “gender bias,” he could not calculate with any
accuracy how often gender bias played a role in employment decisions. Id.
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harm.181 “Merely showing that Wal-Mart’s policy . . . produced
an overall sex-based disparity” did not suffice for showing that
each plaintiff suffered identically under the policy in such a
way that they could be joined together as a class.182 As a result,
class certification was denied, meaning that the three lead
plaintiffs could not bring a suit on behalf of all women allegedly
harmed by Wal-Mart policies, and each of the 1.5 million
women either had to sue individually or form smaller classes
that did possess commonality.183
The holding of Wal-Mart v. Dukes is more than a mere
pleading standard for class action complaints. Instead, it is the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of what is required under the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment for non-parties to
be bound by a judgment in the context of a class action suit.184
Thus, compliance with the concept of “common answers” would
be required not only if a bankruptcy trustee were suing on
behalf of estate creditors in his capacity as a trustee under the
third category explicated in Taylor,185 but would also be required
if the Bankruptcy Code, a “special statutory scheme” under the
sixth category of Taylor,186 were revised to permit trustees to
bring such suits.187 This would remain true whether the trustee
sued on the creditors behalf, which would require a reversal of
Caplin, or through the vehicle of the bankruptcy estate, which
would require the abrogation of the doctrine of in pari delicto.

181 Id. at 2554-55. Since Wal-Mart delegated pay and promotion decisions to
local managers, it was quite possible that some managers had engaged in sexual
discrimination. Id. at 2555. But showing that some managers did this did not
demonstrate that other managers did, and therefore did not show that the entire 1.5
million class members had suffered in this way. Id. at 2554. Moreover, statistical
evidence showing that female employees at Wal-Mart may have been discriminated
against, based upon pay and promotion data, did not show that each individual employee
had been discriminated against in the same way. Id. at 2555. The court noted that at
each individual store, managers could claim varying reasons for failing to promote
women, such as the number, quality, and ambition of their female employees. Id.
182 Id. at 2555-56.
183 Id. at 2561.
184 Id. at 2559 (noting that in a class action, non-party class members lose their
right to sue because the lead plaintiffs litigate for them, so this mechanism must comply
with the Due Process Clause); see also Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 900-01 (2008)
(stating that FED. R. CIV. P. 23 ensures adequate representation in the class action context).
185 Taylor, 553 U.S. at 895-96.
186 Id. at 896.
187 See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 600 F.3d 135, 154, 158 (2d Cir. 2010)
(holding that bankruptcy’s status as a special statutory scheme does not exempt it from
the due process clause in actions in personam); see also DPWN Holdings (USA), Inc. v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 143, 154 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that scope of
discharge in Chapter 11 cases was subject to Due Process Clause); In re General
Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 520 n.143 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (same).
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A Trustee in Picard’s Position Cannot Provide Adequate
Representation to the Estate’s Creditors

Using the Madoff proceedings again as an example,
were Picard to represent customers of BLMIS in a lawsuit
against culpable third party financial institutions, doing so
would bind the non-party customers in persomam and would
therefore have to provide those customers with adequate
representation, which would require a “common answer” to a
common question of law or fact. In the case of BLMIS, while
each customer has a common question of law or fact, namely
that he was defrauded by a Ponzi scheme and has lost money
as a result, this no more suffices to form a class of plaintiffs
that can be adequately represented than a showing that all
female employees of Wal-Mart suffered decreased pay and
promotion because of gender discrimination did in Dukes.188 The
class of plaintiffs must show a common answer to the problem of
having lost money in a Ponzi scheme orchestrated by BLMIS.
At first, it sounds absurd to claim that no common
answer exists for the claims of BLMIS customers. Each
customer lost a sum of money in a Ponzi scheme, and the
common answer to this question of fact would seem to be the
return of his funds. There is no requirement in any of the six
means under Taylor by which non-parties may be bound by a
judgment that each non-party’s claim be of the same amount or
accrued at the same time.189 But this conceptualization grossly
oversimplifies the issue. The customers may simply want their
money back, but a trustee pressing claims under state or
federal law against parties culpable in the debtor’s fraud, such
as the financial institutions that allegedly aided and abetted
Madoff’s Ponzi scheme, encounters a fundamental problem.
The accusation is not that these defendants orchestrated a
Ponzi scheme, but rather that they recruited investors into the
scheme or assisted BLMIS in performing certain transactions
at certain times, which created certain customer losses. Just as
in Dukes, where the “crucial question” focused on “why [a given
Wal-Mart worker] was disfavored,”190 since it was “quite
unbelievable that all managers would exercise their discretion
in a common way” in disfavoring female employees in pay and
promotion,191 it is equally unbelievable that each BLMIS
188
189
190
191

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2555 (citations omitted).
See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 893-95 (2008).
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct at 2552.
Id. at 2555.
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investor invested money in Madoff’s Ponzi scheme as a result
of the same acts by culpable third parties.
Consider two people, Alice and Bruce, who invested
money in a Ponzi scheme orchestrated by a party similar to
BLMIS. Alice invests one million dollars via a feeder fund into
the Ponzi scheme, while Bruce invests one million directly into
the scheme, perhaps based on a personal relationship with the
perpetrator. If a trustee were to sue an entity like HSBC or
UBS that aided and abetted the feeder fund for the one million
dollars in losses suffered by Alice, the proceeds of any recovery
would have to be distributed to both Alice and Bruce on a pro
rata basis.192 Thus, even though the defendants are only liable
to Alice, as she was the only investor that utilized the feeder
fund the defendant aided and abetted, and Bruce would have
no claim against the defendant, Bruce would receive 50% of the
money recovered.193 If Bruce had invested 19 rather than one
million, and Alice’s investment remains the same, Bruce would
get 95% of the recovery, even though on an individual level, he
is entitled to none of it.194 Concomitantly, Alice, who would have
received a 100% distribution on her claim had she sued on her
own, will only receive a 5% distribution in the latter
hypothetical.195 Were she to bring suit against the defendant for
the balance of her claim, either she would be bound in persomam
by the trustee’s judgment or the defendant would be forced to pay
out more than the amount of harm for which it was liable.196
This hypothetical, while obtuse through the use of only
two people, rounded off sums of money, and no administrative
expenses is actually quite similar to the means by which
investors came into BLMIS. One need look no further than two
of the more famous investors in BLMIS for proof. Elie Wiesel,
the Nobel Peace Prize laureate and Holocaust survivor, lost his
life savings and his charity lost $15.2 million after investing

192 See 11 U.S.C. § 726 (2012); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78fff-2(c)(1) (2012). The
Bankruptcy Code converts all of the debtor’s assets, including those it acquires postpetition, into cash, and makes a distribution to each creditor on a pro rata basis based
on that creditor’s priority.
193 Since both investors put in an equal amount of money, and under this
hypothetical there are only two investors, any recovery made on a pro rata basis would
be split equally between the two of them. See 11 U.S.C. § 726; 15 U.S.C. §§ 78fff-2(c)(1).
194 Since the claims against the estate would be $20 million, and Bruce’s claim
of $19 million is 95% of the total outstanding claims, he would receive 95% of any funds
distributed on a pro rata basis.
195 The recovery would be $1 million and Alice’s claim would be for $1 million,
yet she would only get 5% of the money, or $50,000.
196 In the latter case, this would in essence impose liability for Bruce’s claims on the
defendant, even though outside of bankruptcy the defendant would owe no money to Bruce.
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with Madoff after meeting him at two social occasions.197 By
contrast, Liliane Bettencourt, heir to the L’Oreal fortune and
the world’s wealthiest woman, entrusted part of her fortune to
BLMIS via Access International, one of the feeder funds that
UBS is accused of sponsoring.198
Money came into BLMIS, as with many fraudulent
schemes, through as many routes as Madoff could create.199 A
lawsuit that asserted a cause of action against UBS because of
harm suffered by Liliane Bettencourt would have to distribute
a share of the proceeds to Elie Wiesel. While this is perhaps
palatable in a moral sense, it does not comport with the due
process clause and the case law regarding the binding of third
parties.200 In this situation, Ms. Bettencourt has to give up
some of the proceeds of a claim she could fully recover on had
the trustee not brought it on her behalf. Yet if Picard, or a
similarly situated bankruptcy trustee, were to recover funds
from these defendants, the Bankruptcy Code or SIPA would
command him to do just this by distributing the proceeds of the
lawsuit to customers on a pro rata basis.201
As a result, even if the bars imposed by either Caplin or
the doctrine of in pari delicto were lifted, Picard’s suit against
JPM, UBS, and HSBC still should have been dismissed as
Picard was unable to adequately represent BLMIS’s creditors.
Where Picard would need to allocate the proceeds from such
litigation only to the particular creditors who allegedly suffered
harm at the hands of these defendants, the Bankruptcy Code
and SIPA would compel that each BLMIS customer share pro
rata in the proceeds. Picard’s suits therefore cannot meet the
Strom, supra note 11.
Saijel Kishan & Katherine Burton, L’Oreal Heiress Bettencourt Invested
With Madoff, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 24, 2008), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
newsarchive&sid=ayyhrEmIIPes; See UBS Complaint at 9-11.
199 See HSBC Complaint, supra note 129, at 10-11. The complaint describes
how after Madoff had exhausted his connections in America, “[h]is attention turned to
potential investors abroad.” Id. at 10. It further describes how various individuals were
recruited as “ambassadors” to both set up feeder funds and then recruit victims to
invest in BLMIS via these funds. Id. at 10-11.
200 A proceeding that takes one’s cause of action and litigates it for the benefit
of other parties can hardly be said to have adopted “special procedures to safeguard the
interests of absentees.” Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 897-98 (2008) (citing S. Cent.
Bell Tel. Co. v. Alabama, 526 U.S. 160 (1999).
201 15 U.S.C. §§ 78fff-2(c) (2012). The same would be true if the case were filed
under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code and a distribution were made according to the
Code’s scheme. See 11 U.S.C. § 726(a) (2012). This would additionally be offensive by taking
away from a creditor an interest in an intangible asset she possesses, here the proceeds
from a cause of action. Although not directly akin to depriving a secured creditor of its
collateral, it would still offend a general protection of property rights that runs through U.S.
bankruptcy law. See, e.g., In re Treco, 240 F.3d 148, 159-60 (2d Cir. 2001) (discussing the
constitutional importance of secured creditors’ rights in U.S. bankruptcy law).
197

198
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common answers test of Dukes and therefore does not satisfy
the due process clause. None of this is to say that the
Bankruptcy Code or SIPA could not be amended to provide a
trustee with a way to adequately represent creditors in suits
against third parties, but until such an amendment is effected,
any proposed solution would have to create an independent
mechanism to ensure that there is not a “failure of due process”
in these cases.202
III.

LITIGATION TRUSTS

In a number of recent cases, bankruptcy trustees and
the estate’s creditors have side-stepped the doctrine of in pari
delicto, the holding of Caplin, and the Wagoner Rule to allow
the trustee to represent the estate’s creditors in suits against
third parties alleged to be responsible for the debtor’s failure.
This has been done through a variety of means, including
selective pleading to allow the estate to sue third parties,
having the estate take assignment of creditor claims, and the
creation of litigation trusts pursuant to Chapter 11 plans that
take assignment of creditor claims and act as the named
plaintiff in suits subsequent against these third parties. The
trusts are overseen by the bankruptcy trustee and distribute
the proceeds of any settlements or judgments obtained to the
creditors, who are beneficiaries of the trusts. This part will
provide a succinct summary of these stratagems, and note
where they have and have not addressed the due process clause
concerns raised in the prior part.
A.

Cases Involving Trustees Suing on Behalf of Debtors

The first line of cases that has permitted trustees to
bring suit on behalf of creditors sidestepped the Wagoner Rule
permitting the trustee to file suit against culpable third parties
on behalf of the debtor’s estate.203 Because the trustee is
bringing suit on behalf of the estate, the holding of Caplin is
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42 (1940).
See Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750 (7th Cir. 1995); Sender v. Mann, 423 F.
Supp. 2d 1155 (D. Colo. 2006); Collins v. Kohlberg & Co. (In re Sw. Supermarkets, L.L.C.),
315 B.R. 565 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2004); Schnelling v. Thomas (In re Agribiotech, Inc.), 319 B.R.
207 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2004); Gordon v. Basroon (In re Plaza Mortgage and Finance Corp.),
187 B.R. 37 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1995); O’Halloran v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 969 So. 2d
1039 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). The Wagoner Rule provides that claims that a corporation
was defrauded with the assistance of its insiders accrue to the corporation’s creditors, not
to the corporation. See supra Part I.D. Thus, the estate would not possess causes of action
for the trustee to sue on were the Wagoner Rule adhered to.
202

203
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not implicated. The key for a trustee to have standing to bring
such claims was “to allege a claim belonging to the debtor for
an injury to the debtor conceptually distinct from the injury to
defrauded investors or creditors.”204
For example, in Scholes v. Lehmann, a receiver
overseeing a failed Ponzi scheme had collected about 40% of the
investors’ losses by liquidating assets of the debtor.205 To
enhance the recovery, the receiver sought to recover transfers
of assets made by the principal to the principal’s ex-wife, an
investor, and five charities.206 The receiver was permitted to
bring such claims because he was trying to recover the losses
suffered by the corporation from having its assets fraudulently
transferred to third parties.207
Similarly, in Plaza Mortgage, a bankruptcy trustee
overseeing another failed Ponzi scheme208 brought suit against
the debtor’s accountants, arguing that they participated in a
“fraudulent conspiracy” that depleted the debtor’s assets.209 The
trustee was careful to argue that the damages he was seeking
were not the same as the losses suffered by the estate’s
creditors,210 though this argument did not appear to be
persuasive.211 As the Plaza Mortgage court summarized, a
trustee may bring claims on behalf of investors so long as he is
“careful to plead claims belonging to the debtor and injury to the
debtor . . . [and] . . . [is] careful not to plead for a recovery based
on an injury to the investors/creditors, even though the fraud on
the investors will be a part of the background allegations.”212
Several issues exist with this approach. First, funds
collected by the estate must be distributed pursuant to the
Bankruptcy Code, which may result in distributions to
creditors who would not otherwise hold a claim against the
Plaza Mortgage, 187 B.R. at 42.
Scholes, 56 F.3d at 752-53.
206 Id. at 753.
207 Id. at 754. Such an allegation will nonetheless remain subject to an in pari
delicto defense. Id. at 754-55.
208 Plaza Mortgage, 187 B.R. at 39.
209 Id. at 43.
210 Id. at 44.
211 In response to an interrogatory on the damages he was seeking, the trustee
stated that it would be “the difference between the amount invested in [the debtor’s
Ponzi scheme] and the value of the estate on the date the bankruptcy petition was
filed.” In other words, damages would be the amount of the creditors’ losses after the
estate made a distribution. When the defendants pointed this out, the trustee
backpedalled and called this “a preliminary damage analysis” and noted that other
formulas may later be used. Id.
212 Id. The court also warned trustees not to plead damages equal to the
amount lost in the Ponzi scheme. Instead, they should be measured on the basis of
“funds improperly paid out by the debtor.” Id. at 45.
204

205
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defendants to the detriment of those who did.213 Second, the
approach is generally limited to fraudulent conveyance actions,214
which are provided for by statute.215 State common law causes of
action of the sort brought in the Madoff case would likely not be
eligible. Third, the doctrine of in pari delicto still hangs in the
air.216 While this might not be an issue in a receivership where the
Bankruptcy Code is not applicable,217 or where suits are brought
under statutory avoidance actions,218 it will not work for common
law claims such as those brought in the Madoff proceedings.219
B.

Cases Involving Trustees Taking Assignment of Claims
from Creditors

Trustees have also sought to expand the recovery for
creditors by taking an assignment of their claims. Trustees
could then proceed under the theory that Caplin was not on
point because the trustee was only liquidating estate assets
rather than directly representing the creditors.
For example in Sender v. Mann, a case involving yet
another failed Ponzi scheme,220 the trustee took assignment of
creditors’ claims against the debtor’s lawyers, who were accused
of enabling the scheme.221 The court distinguished these facts
from those of Caplin.222 Similarly, in the Madoff proceedings,
Picard has established standing to bring claims on behalf of
assigning creditors.223 These claims were obtained both from
customers of BLMIS and from settlement agreements in claims
against certain feeder funds.224
See supra Part II.B.2.
See, e.g., Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750, 753 (7th Cir. 1995).
215 See, e.g., id. (describing how Illinois law provided for a fraudulent transfer
cause of action); see also 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (2012).
216 See,
e.g., Plaza Mortgage, 187 B.R. at 45-47; O’Halloran v.
PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 969 So. 2d 1039, 1044-47 (2007). In many of these cases,
the procedural posture is a motion to dismiss, and because in pari delicto is a factbased inquiry, the trustee’s complaint could survive such a motion. See, e.g.,
O’Halloran v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 969 So. 2d at 1046-47; Plaza Mortgage,
187 B.R. at 47.
217 See Sender v. Buchanan (In re Hedged-Investments Assoc’s, Inc.), 84 F.3d
1281, 1285 (10th Cir. 1996).
218 See In re Hawaiian Telcom Commc’ns, Inc., 483 B.R. 217 (Bankr. D. Haw. 2012).
219 See supra Part II.A.
220 Sender v. Mann, 423 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1160 (D. Colo. 2006).
221 Id. at 1160.
222 Id. Since the claims became estate property after the assignment, there was no
argument that the Code did not authorize the representation. There was also no risk of
inconsistent recovery since the assignors lost the right to sue after the assignment. Id.
223 Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, No. 12-mc-115JSR, 2013 WL 6301415, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2013).
224 Id. at *3.
213

214
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Courts in the Ninth Circuit have had to contend with
the Williams225 decision in reviewing claims assignments taken
by bankruptcy trustees.226 In AgriBioTech, certain creditors
were assigned to the bankruptcy estate claims against the
debtor’s directors and officers.227 The trustee brought suit as
the assignee of the creditors’ claims, and the issue was whether
the holding of Williams barred the assignment.228 The court
noted that in Williams, only those creditors that assigned
claims would receive a recovery.229 The court therefore reasoned
that the creditors in Williams “assigned only the right to bring
suit, not the right to recover on those claims.”230 The trustee
there was acting not on behalf of the estate but rather on
behalf of the individual creditors.231 Conversely, in AgriBioTech
any recovery made on behalf of the assigning creditors would
become estate property that would be distributed pro rata to all
creditors, including creditors that did not assign their claims.232
As a result, the holding of Williams did not apply.233
Given that the assignment of creditor claims was
designed as an end-run around the holdings of Caplin and
Williams, it is not surprising to discover several bugs. First,
even after the debtor takes possession of the claims, the debtor
will still have to overcome the in pari delicto defense. While
some courts are forgiving on this point,234 others may not be.235
Williams v. Cal. 1st Bank, 859 F.2d 664 (9th Cir. 1988); see also supra Part I.C.
Logan v. JKV Real Estate Services (In re Bogdan), 414 F.3d 507, 512-13
(4th Cir. 2005); Collins v. Kohlberg & Co. (In re Sw. Supermarkets, L.L.C.), 315 B.R.
565, 571 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2004); Schnelling v. Thomas (In re Agribiotech, Inc.), 319 B.R.
207 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2004).
227 Agribiotech, 319 B.R. at 209.
228 Id. at 214.
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 Id. This was true even though the assigning creditors in Williams would
share pro rata in any recovery, creating a sort of “sub-estate” on whose behalf the
trustee was acting. Williams v. Cal. 1st Bank, 859 F.2d 664, 665 (9th Cir.1988).
232 Agribiotech, 319 B.R. at 214.
233 Since the claims and the recovery were estate property, the trustee was
merely marshaling and liquidating estate assets, not acting on behalf of individual
creditors. There would also be no conflicting results since the assigning creditors lost
the right to sue, and conflicting recoveries with non-assigning creditors should not
matter. Agribiotech, 319 B.R. at 214-15; see also Collins v. Kohlberg & Co. (In re Sw.
Supermarkets, L.L.C.), 315 B.R. 565, 569-71 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2004).
234 Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 1995). Judge Posner
described corporations under the control of the orchestrator of a Ponzi scheme as “evil
zombies” and noted that where the “appointment of the receiver remov[es] the
wrongdoer from the scene” the reasons for the defense no longer remain; see also Logan
v. JKV Real Estate Services (In re Bogdan), 414 F.3d 507, 514 (4th Cir. 2005). The
court in Bogdan found that after taking assignment of creditor claims, the trustee had
stepped into the shoes of the creditors rather than the debtor. However, this seems to
sidestep the issue by letting the trustee have his cake and eat it too. If the trustee
represents the creditors, Caplin forbids the suit. By taking assignment, he side-steps
225

226
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Second, if creditors’ claims must be assigned to the bankruptcy
estate, any distribution must be made pro rata to all creditors
according to the Bankruptcy Code. Creditors that do not assign
their claims will receive a distribution from the proceeds of the
litigation. Each individual creditor therefore has the incentive
to retain their claim and, if they are not paid in full by the
estate, to piggy-back on the trustee’s efforts in their own suit.236
Resultantly, the assignment of creditor claims does little to
address the issues raised in Part II.B regarding the issues of
adequate representation. The cases are important, however, in
the sense that they undermined the holding of Williams and
laid the groundwork for litigation trusts.
C.

Litigation Trusts in Bankruptcy

A more recent line of cases has allowed bankruptcy trustees
to represent creditors of the estate so long as there is a corporate
entity serving as a middleman between them.237 The Caplin
holding is avoided because the creditors transfer their claims to an
independent entity, usually a limited liability company, and the
trustee represents that entity rather than the creditors.
1. The First Use of Litigation Trusts: Semi-Tech
Litigation, LLC v. Bankers Trust Co.
One of the first written opinions on this issue was in the
case of Semi-Tech Litigation, LLC v. Bankers Trust Co.238 The
facts of that case are remarkably similar to those of Caplin; the
debtor had borrowed $654 million through the issuance of notes

Caplin, but he does this by bringing the causes of action into the “shoes” he is wearing
as a representative of the debtor’s estate. The trustee cannot claim to be the debtor’s
representative on the issue of standing yet claim to be the creditors’ representative on
the issue of affirmative defenses.
235 Breeden v. Kirkpatrick & Lockhart LLP (In re The Bennett Funding Grp., Inc.),
336 F.3d 94, 102 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Barnes v. Schatzkin, 215 A.D. 10 (N.Y. App. Div. 1925)).
236 One of the reasons underpinning the decision in Caplin was the idea that
creditors should be permitted to decide “whether or not it is worthwhile to seek to
recoup whatever losses they may have suffered” through a suit against third parties.
Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co. of N.Y., 406 U.S. 416, 431 (1972). In this
instance, the decision would be premised on a free rider problem rather than any
assessment of the merits of the litigation.
237 See Dan Schechter, Commercial Finance Newsletter, 2011 Comm. Fin.
News 94 (Nov. 21, 2011) (describing the Tribune case and noting a lack of surprise if
the Supreme Court were to overturn it); Dan Schechter, Commercial Finance
Newsletter, 2011 Comm. Fin. News 33 (Apr. 26, 2010) (describing same with Taberna);
Dan Schechter, Commercial Finance Newsletter, 2011 Comm. Fin. News 28 (Apr. 5,
2010) (describing same with Grede).
238 272 F. Supp. 2d 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).

1690

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:4

pursuant to an indenture agreement between the debtor and
Bankers Trust Company.239 The indenture contained a list of
covenants, including compliance with certain financial ratios.240
After the debtor filed for bankruptcy, suit was brought against
Bankers Trust alleging that it failed to monitor the debtor’s
compliance with the indenture and was unduly credulous in
believing the debtor’s assertions of compliance.241
There was one significant difference between Semi-Tech
and Caplin: the plaintiff in Semi-Tech was not the debtor or the
bankruptcy trustee but a Delaware limited liability company
created pursuant to the debtor’s Chapter 11 plan.242 Under the
debtor’s plan, a lengthy list of causes of action, including those
against Bankers Trust, were assigned by each of the creditors
to the limited liability company.243 The litigation trust then
filed suit against Bankers Trust in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, and Bankers
Trust filed a motion to dismiss.244 Bankers Trust argued that
“neither a bankruptcy estate nor an entity created by a
reorganization or liquidation plan has standing to assert claims
of third parties . . . regardless of any assignment by a
confirmed plan . . . .”245 The court discussed the grounds on
which Caplin’s holding was based,246 but noted that the case
was distinguishable because of the employment of the trust.247
Because of the claims assignments, the court also
addressed the holding of Williams v. 1st Bank248 and noted that
239 Id. at 321. Similarly, in Caplin the debtor raised $8.6 million through the
issuance of debentures subject to an indenture agreement. Caplin v. Marine Midland
Grace Trust Co. of N.Y., 406 U.S. 416, 417 (1972).
240 Semi-Tech, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 321. Similarly, in Caplin the debtor was
subject to certain limitations, including the maintenance of a two to one asset to debt
ratio. Caplin, 406 U.S. at 417.
241 Semi-Tech, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 321. Similarly, in Caplin, the indenture
trustee was accused of failing to detect the debtor’s consistent violation of the asset to
debt ratio requirement. Caplin, 406 U.S. at 417-18.
242 Semi-Tech, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 321.
243 Id. at 322. Each creditor, when voting on the Chapter 11 plan, had the
option to elect to assign its claims against the debtor to the trust. However, other
language in the plan indicated that each creditor was deemed to have assigned its
claims unless it affirmatively rejected assignment. As a result, creditors who left the
form blank were deemed to have assigned their claims. Id.
244 Id. at 321.
245 Id. at 322. They also pressed other arguments relating to the validity of the
assignments that are not relevant here. Id. at 323.
246 The court explicated three reasons for the holding: (1) the Bankruptcy Act
did not authorize a trustee to sue on behalf of third parties; (2) individual creditors
should get to decide whether they want to sue; and (3) there was a risk of inconsistent
results between the trustee’s action and those of individual creditors that the trustee
did not represent. Id.
247 Id.
248 Williams v. Cal. 1st Bank, 859 F.2d 664 (9th Cir. 1988).

2014]

LITIGATION TRUSTS IN CHAPTER 11 BANKRUPTCIES

1691

“this Court does not find Williams persuasive.”249 It found that
the issue in Williams was “whether assignments should be
stripped of legal effect because the assignee is a creature of
bankruptcy.”250 The court reasoned that because assignees
rarely have claims of their own to sue on and the risk of
inconsistent results is always present in assignations, there
was no reason to treat assignments in bankruptcy differently.251
As a result, the litigation trust had standing to pursue claims
against Bankers Trust on behalf of the creditors of the
bankruptcy estate that had assigned their claims.252
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the “insightful
and thorough” opinion and adopted it as “the law of this
Circuit.”253 Further, in a separate suit involving a complaint by
the Semi-Tech litigation trust against the debtor’s accountant,
a New York state appellate court cited the federal court
litigation against Bankers Trust Company in refusing to
dismiss the complaint.254 In affirming the decision below, the
court distinguished the case of Barnes v. Schatzkin,255 which
like Williams, held that trustees may not take assignments of

Semi-Tech, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 323.
Id.
251 Id. at 324. It is important to note the distinction between this argument on
Williams and that put forth in AgriBioTech. The latter case reasoned that Williams
was distinguishable because in Williams any recoveries would flow through the trustee
to the assigning creditors, and thus those creditors “assigned only the right to bring
suit, not the right to recover on those claims.” Schnelling v. Thomas (In re Agribiotech,
Inc.), 319 B.R. 207, 214 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2004). Williams was therefore distinguishable
in that case because the recovery flowed directly to the bankruptcy estate and all
creditors shared pro rata in the proceeds. Id. In Semi-Tech, recoveries made by the
litigation trust would be distributed pursuant to the terms of the trust agreement
rather than the Bankruptcy Code.
252 Semi-Tech, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 323.
253 Semi-Tech Litig., LLC v. Bankers Trust Co., 450 F.3d 121, 126-27 (2d Cir.
2006). The court did not even discuss the issue of Caplin, merely noting in passing that
Caplin “does not deprive [the litigation trust] of standing to assert the claims of the
Noteholders.” Id. at 123.
254 Semi-Tech Litig., LLC v. Ting, 787 N.Y.S.2d 234, 236 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004).
255 212 N.Y.S. 536 (1925), aff ’ d 242 N.Y. 555 (1926). In Barnes, the debtor
purportedly ran a brokerage firm but instead defrauded its customers. Id. at 537. The
bankruptcy trustee sued a stock broker that allegedly aided and abetted the debtor on
behalf of 164 defrauded former customers of the debtor. Id. The court rejected the idea
that a trustee may take assignment of claims from creditors, noting that “[i]f the
trustee may take an assignment of these claims he might take an assignment of a
claim from any stranger and force the estate into an expensive litigation.” Id. at 538.
Since the claims the trustee was litigating did not belong to the debtor and therefore
did not belong to the estate, absent statutory authorization to take assignments the
court would not imply such a right. Id. at 539.
249
250
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claims.256 Because the assignment here was not to the trustee but
“to a specially created entity,” the holding was not on point.257
2. The Expanded Use of Litigation Trusts: In re CBI
Holding Company, Inc.
In 2008, the Second Circuit reaffirmed and expanded
the holding of Semi-Tech in Bankruptcy Services, Inc. v. Ernst
& Young LLP (In re CBI Holding Company, Inc.).258 In that
case, the debtor was a pharmaceutical company that financed
its growth by acquiring other companies. It financed these
acquisitions in part by issuing debt and equity instruments to
Trust Company of the West (TCW).259 Like the debtor in
Caplin, this financing agreement was subject to certain
limitations260 that the debtor breached through fraudulent
misrepresentations.261 Ernst & Young, the debtor’s accountants,
failed to detect this fraud.262
Under the debtor’s bankruptcy plan, all equity interests
in the debtor were extinguished and an entity called
Bankruptcy Services, Inc. (BSI) was appointed to administer
the debtor’s estate.263 Since the debtor’s business operations
had ceased, this simply included liquidating the assets of the
debtor’s estate as a trustee would.264 The debtor’s unsecured
creditors and TCW assigned all of their rights in any causes of
action against any third parties to BSI, and BSI filed suit
against Ernst & Young.265 The bankruptcy court entered
judgment in BSI’s favor, but the district court reversed, finding
that “a bankruptcy trustee does not have standing to assert
256 Semi-Tech, 787 N.Y.S.2d at 236. Barnes was cited in Wagoner for the
proposition that assignments to a bankruptcy trustee are invalid. Shearson Lehman
Hutton, Inc. v. Wagoner, 944 F.2d 114, 118 (2d Cir. 1991).
257 Semi-Tech, 787 N.Y.S.2d at 236.
258 529 F.3d 432, 456 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that “federal bankruptcy law
permits [the litigation trustee] to press [creditor] claims against” the third party
accountants alleged to have contributed to creditor losses.
259 Id. at 439.
260 TCW owned 48% of the equity in the debtor, and was permitted to take
control of the company on the occurrence of certain default provisions, which included
the failure to maintain certain financial metrics. Id.
261 The debtor engaged in a scheme to inflate the value of its assets through
“inventory fraud.” This included entering payments to vendors for shipped goods as
pre-payments for future goods, therefore showing them as assets rather than expenses.
It also included inflating the amount and value of the debtor’s inventory. Id. at 440.
262 Id. at 440-41.
263 Id. at 441.
264 Id.
265 Id. at 441-42. Since the claim was brought on behalf of TCW, BSI did not
need to only plead harm to the debtor as the court in Plaza Mortgage suggested. See
Gordon v. Basroon (In re Plaza Mortgage and Finance Corp.), 187 B.R. 37, 44-45
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1995).

2014]

LITIGATION TRUSTS IN CHAPTER 11 BANKRUPTCIES

1693

claims against third parties on behalf of creditors of a corporation,
even where the creditors assigned their claims to the trustee.”266
The Second Circuit reversed the district court and held
that BSI had standing to press the claims against Ernst &
Young.267 Relying on Semi-Tech, the court held that claims
assigned to a bankruptcy estate become estate property and
may be liquidated by a trustee as he would any other asset.268
The court was not persuaded by Ernst & Young’s argument
that the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code precluded
the holding reached in Semi-Tech,269 and noted that New York
case law does not preclude it either.270 It further concluded that
Congress’s failure to overrule Caplin in 1978 did not indicate a
desire to prevent creditors from transferring their claims
pursuant to a Chapter 11 plan.271 The court went on to note that
“[a]llowing a debtor’s creditors to assign their claims . . . [gives]
bankruptcy courts the flexibility in reorganizing or liquidating a
debtor’s assets necessary to achieve efficient administration of the
reorganization or liquidation.”272 It further noted that the holding
of Barnes “would unnecessarily hamstring [debtors and creditors]
on the basis of an outdated version of the Bankruptcy Code.”273
The decision was important because unlike the line of
cases discussed in this Part that steered around Williams by
having an estate take an assignment of claims, here an
independent entity took the assignment. Further, instead of
requiring that distributions be made according to the distribution
scheme of the Bankruptcy Code, CBI Holdings held that trustees
may take assignments without any contingencies. As a result,
trustees can litigate assigned claims and distribute the proceeds
by a custom method proposed in the Chapter 11 plan.

266 CBI Holding Co., 529 F.3d at 446-47 (citing Breeden v. Kirkpatrick &
Lockhart LLP (In re Bennett Funding Grp., Inc.), 336 F.3d 94, 102 (2d Cir. 2003)).
267 CBI Holding Co., 529 F.3d at 459.
268 Id. at 456-59 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(7) (2012) (which makes property of
the estate assets acquired by the estate after the filing of the bankruptcy petition)).
269 Id. at 457-58 (discussing the possible repeal of Caplin in 1978).
270 Id. at 458-59. The defendants argued that the holding of P&F Indus. v.
Medallion Grp., 476 N.Y.S.2d 928 (2d Dep’t 1984), where a trustee’s attempt to sue
third parties on behalf of the estate did not preclude one of those third parties from
later bringing suit, conflicted with Semi-Tech. The court noted that there was no
conflict here, as no assignment occurred in P&F. Id. at 459.
271 Id. at 458.
272 Id. at 459.
273 Id.
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3. The Near-Complete Abrogation of Caplin: Grede v.
Bank of New York Mellon
These points became especially relevant when the
Seventh Circuit adopted the holding of Semi-Tech. In Grede v.
Bank of New York Mellon,274 the debtor, Sentinel Management
Group, Inc., was a “futures commission merchant and investment
manager or commodity brokers, pension funds, and wealthy
persons.”275 Sentinel’s customers believed they were defrauded
and that The Bank of New York Mellon (BONY) aided and
abetted Sentinel in this.276 To facilitate litigation against BONY,
the debtor’s Chapter 11 plan created a liquidation trust that took
assignment of the creditors’ claims.277
However, the trustee of the liquidation trust was the
same individual that had served as the trustee of the Chapter
11 proceeding.278 Further, under the liquidating trust
agreement, only creditors that assigned claims to the estate
were eligible to receive a distribution from the funds generated
by these claims.279 Because the trust took possession of other
assets, it did this by creating a tranche of assets composed of
the claims that creditors assigned to it.280 Because all estate
property was transferred to the liquidation trust, this had the
effect of bifurcating the funds distributed by the trust: all
creditors would share pro rata in estate assets but assigning
creditors would receive an additional distribution representing
their share of the assigned claims.281
Grede therefore effected almost a full abrogation of
Caplin. A bankruptcy trustee was permitted to represent
creditors of a bankruptcy estate in their claims against third
parties, with a distribution to be made not according to the
Bankruptcy Code but instead according to the creditors’ claims.
All it took to make Caplin ineffective was a limited liability
company to serve as a middleman between the bankruptcy
trustee and the creditors. In a brief opinion, the Seventh
598 F.3d 899 (7th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 900.
276 BONY served as Sentinel’s “clearing bank, lender, and depository for
investment pools.” Id.
277 Id.
278 Id.
279 Liquidation Trust Agreement at 3, In re Sentinel Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 398
B.R. 281 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2008) (No. 07-14987 (JHS)). The agreement elected to
provide for only a pro rata distribution on this tranche, though nothing would preclude
more detailed arrangements.
280 Fourth Amended Chapter 11 Plan of Liquidation at 29, In re Sentinel
Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 398 B.R. 281 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2008) (No. 07-14987 (JHS)).
281 Id. at 26.
274

275
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Circuit held that the reasons for the Supreme Court’s holding
in Caplin did not apply to the facts of the case, and therefore
Caplin “does not apply to the activities of a liquidating trust
created by a plan of reorganization (or, for that matter, an exdebtor operating under a confirmed plan).”282
The court’s reasoning for finding that Caplin did not
apply was also important. The first ground for the holding in
Caplin was that the Bankruptcy Act did not authorize trustees
to take assignment of creditor claims.283 Whereas other courts
had held that claims assigned post-confirmation became
property of the estate pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code,284 the
court in Grede held that while the Code governs “trustee[s] in
bankruptcy, the terms of the plan of reorganization (and of the
trust instrument) govern the permissible duties of a trustee after
bankruptcy.”285 In other words, the case could be read to say that
Caplin does not apply at all to trustees operating post-confirmation
according to either a Chapter 11 plan or a trust agreement.286
The idea that Caplin is limited to the exact facts of the
case has now become so commonplace that courts will approve
the usage of a litigation trust with little more than a string
citation.287 Moreover, the type of trust created in Grede,
whereby distributions are made to assigning creditors rather
than to all creditors, is becoming the norm.288 Additionally,
rather than asking creditors to affirmatively execute an
assignment in favor of the trust, Chapter 11 plans will now
indicate that on confirmation of the Chapter 11 plan, creditor
claims will be assigned by operation of the law unless the
282 Grede, 598 F.3d at 903; see also In re Tribune Co., 464 B.R. 126, 193
(Bankr. D. Del. 2011) (describing the trustee of a litigation trust as “is not acting as a
representative of the Debtors or their estates, so the concerns for statutory trustees
expressed in Caplin are not raised by this Plan provision”).
283 Grede, 598 F.3d at 901.
284 See Bankruptcy Services, Inc. v. Ernst & Young (In re CBI Holding Co.),
529 F.3d 432, 446-47 (2d Cir. 2008).
285 Grede, 598 F.3d at 902.
286 The court also noted that the issue of subrogation that arose in Caplin was
immaterial because “the Bank would have had to make such an argument in the
bankruptcy court, and it did not.” Id.
Thus, under Grede, it would seem that a creditor must object at the
debtor’s confirmation hearing to the standing of a trustee taking assignment of claims
against it under a Chapter 11 plan rather than waiting until suit is brought. This is a
further limitation on the holding of Caplin, since in that case, the court made the
argument for the benefit of the entire estate and not merely the defendant. See Caplin
v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co. of N.Y., 406 U.S. 416, 4331 (1972).
287 Taberna Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Jaggi, No. 08-Civ-11355(DLC), 2010 WL
1424002, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2010); Zazzali v. Hirschler Fleischer, P.C., 482 B.R.
495, 510-11 (D. Del. 2012) (distinguishing Caplin in a mere paragraph); In re Tribune
Co., 464 B.R. 126, 192-93 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011).
288 See Tribune Co., 464 B.R. at 192-93.
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creditor takes affirmative steps to “opt out.”289 Some litigation
trusts will even claim causes of action by all creditors with no
further steps needed by those creditors.290
4. Remaining Opposition to Litigation Trusts:
Mukamal v. Bakes
While the Second291 and Seventh292 Circuits have
embraced litigation trusts and the Fourth Circuit293 and courts
within the Ninth Circuit294 have permitted bankruptcy estates
to take assignments of creditor claims so long as no priority is
given to assigning creditors, at least one court in the Eleventh
Circuit has remained resistant.295
For example, in 2007 a lawsuit was brought in the
Southern District of Florida by the trustee of a trust fund
created pursuant to a Chapter 11 plan.296 The debtor had run a
company into insolvency in circumstances akin to a Ponzi
scheme297 and had incurred substantial additional debt when
the debtor’s controlling shareholders tried to sell the company
off to turn a profit on their investment.298 The actions of the
debtor’s controlling shareholders, aided and abetted by the
debtor’s accountants, not only caused harm to foreseeable
Id. at 193.
See Order Confirming Chapter 11 Plan, Exhibit A, Third Amended and
Restated Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization for the Lyondellbasell Debtors at 6063, In re Lyondell Chemical Co., No. 09-10023-REG (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2010),
ECF No. 4418 (defining the creditor trust in that case generally); see also id. at 8
(defining the “Creditor Trust Beneficiaries” as all creditors of certain classes of claims).
291 See Semi-Tech Litig., LLC v. Bankers Trust Co. (In re Bankers Trust Co.),
450 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2006).
292 See Grede v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 598 F.3d 899 (7th Cir. 2010).
293 See Logan v. JKV Real Estate Services (In re Bogdan), 414 F.3d 507
(4th Cir. 2005).
294 See Schnelling v. Thomas (In re Agribiotech, Inc.), 319 B.R. 207 (Bankr.
D. Nev. 2004).
295 Mukamal v. Bakes, 383 B.R. 798, 811-12 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007) aff ’ d 378
F. App’x. 890, 899 (11th Cir. 2010).
296 Id. The trust arose from the bankruptcy proceeding of Far & Wide Corporation
and its affiliates. The trustee filed suit against the directors and officers of the debtors, the
debtors’ accountants, and the debtors’ controlling shareholders. Id. at 803.
297 Id. The debtor sold “travel related services . . . 60 days before a customer’s
departure” on a vacation and paid for those services “45-60 days after” the customer
returned. New revenue soon became a source for old expenses. Id. at 806.
298 The debtor was financed by $70 million in secured debt and an additional
$20 million in unsecured debt. The debtor’s management then began using “false and
misleading” financial statements to obtain forbearance from their lenders so they could
try to sell the entity “at a price high enough to give [the debtor’s controlling
shareholder] a return on [its] initial investment.” Ernst & Young was employed to
prepare the allegedly false financial statements. This permitted the debtor to both
incur another $20 million in unsecured debt and to continue incurring liabilities to
customers and vendors through its Ponzi-like operations. Id. at 806-07.
289
290
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creditors that reasonably relied on the false financial statements
but also permitted the debtor to incur additional secured debt “at
the expense of [the debtor] and [its] creditors.”299 Given the indicia
of fraud in the proceeding, a Chapter 11 trustee was appointed to
oversee confirmation of the plan.300
The plan created a litigation trust that took assignment
of all causes of action belonging to the debtor’s creditors.301
Additionally, the litigation trustee was not the Chapter 11
trustee of the bankruptcy case but rather an independent party
that had experience serving as a bankruptcy trustee.302
Nonetheless, the court held that “[w]ithout doubt, Caplin and
its progeny apply here.”303 Relying on Bennett,304 the court noted
that Caplin applies even where a creditor has assigned its
claims.305 This was because some creditors could reject the plan
and retain the claims for themselves, which would implicate
Caplin’s third factor by creating a risk that their recovery would
be inconsistent with what the trustee recovered.306 The court
also relied on Williams307 for the proposition that Caplin’s third
Id. at 807.
See Notice Appointing Trustee Alan L Goldberg and Setting of Bond in the
amount of $320,000.00, In re Fair & Wide Corp., No. 03-40415(RAM) (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
Sept. 8, 2005), ECF No. 1211 .
301 See id. at 810.
302 Amended Complaint, Exhibit A at 9-10, Mukamal v. Bakes, No. 07-cv20793-ASG (S.D. Fla. Dec. 5, 2007), ECF No. 46-1.
303 Mukamal v. Bakes, 383 B.R. at 811.
304 Breeden v. Kirkpatrick & Lockhart LLP (In re The Bennett Funding Grp.,
Inc.), 336 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2003).
305 Mukamal v. Bakes, 383 B.R. at 811. This, however, is not an accurate
description of the holding in Bennett. In that case, the trustee sued on behalf of the
estate, and was barred under the Wagoner Rule, which notes that claims against third
parties for aiding and abetting a debtor accrue to the estate’s creditors, not to the
estate since in pari delicto bars the estate’s claims. Breeden v. Kirkpatrick, 336 F.3d at
100. Bennett merely cited Barnes in passing for the proposition that had an assignment
occurred, it would not be upheld. Id. at 102. However, the ability of a trustee to take
assignment of creditor claims had already been upheld by the Second Circuit, arguably
overruling this portion of the Breeden opinion. Semi-Tech Litig., LLC v. Bankers Trust
Co., 272 F. Supp. 2d 319, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) aff ’ d 450 F.3d 121, 123 (2d Cir. 2006).
Barnes was also rejected by the Second Circuit a year later. Bankruptcy Services, Inc. v.
Ernst & Young LP (In re CBI Holding Co.), 529 F.3d 432, 439 (2d Cir. 2008). Although the
Second Circuit cannot overturn a New York Court of Appeals decision, New York case law
is also not binding in Florida, and a 2006 federal appeals court decision is arguably more
persuasive than a state law case from the early twentieth century.
306 Mukamal v. Bakes, 383 B.R. at 813. This is a completely inaccurate view of
Caplin’s third factor. In Caplin, the trustee did not take assignment of the claims, so
both the trustee and the creditor could file suit for the same injury but press disparate
legal claims. Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co. of N.Y., 406 U.S. 416, 431-32
(1972). The Caplin court also feared that a settlement of one claim would not bind the
other party, and that litigation for the same claims would proliferate, generating
duplicative recoveries. Id. at 432. In Mukamal, only non-assigning creditors would only
be able to sue for their individual injuries, and the litigation trust would only be able to
sue for the injuries of those creditors that assigned their claims.
307 Williams v. Cal. 1st Bank, 859 F.2d 664 (9th Cir. 1988).
299
300
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factor was implicated since only those creditors that assigned
their claims were eligible to receive a recovery from the
proceeds of any litigation.308 It concluded that although the
Eleventh Circuit had not addressed the interplay of litigation
trusts and Caplin, it would reject the arrangement.309 The court
did leave open the question of whether a litigation trust might be
upheld if every single creditor with a claim assigned it to the estate,
all claims became estate property, and a distribution on the claims
was made pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code.310 In an unpublished
decision, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal.311
D.

Conclusion: Litigation Trusts As Class Action Lawsuits

Litigation trusts skirt the intent of the Wagoner Rule,
the holding of Caplin, and the doctrine of in pari delicto by
having creditors assign their claims for the purpose of bringing
suit to an entity that is neither the debtor nor the bankruptcy
trustee. As this assignment is increasingly effected through the
Chapter 11 plan confirmation process, the bankruptcy court is
essentially certifying a class action suit by the debtor’s
creditors, with a corporate entity to serve as the lead plaintiff
and the bankruptcy trustee to serve as plaintiff’s counsel.
In the context of the Madoff proceedings, there is not a
glaringly obvious reason why Irving Picard cannot create a
limited liability company, make himself the managing member,
and solicit each customer of BLMIS in his capacity as the
managing member of that limited liability company to transfer
any claims they have against culpable financial institutions to
the LLC for prosecution.312 Picard could then file precisely the
Mukamal v. Bakes, 383 B.R. at 811-12.
Id. at 812 (citing E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Hadley, 901 F.2d 979 (11th Cir. 1990)).
310 Id. at 814 (citing Logan v. JKV Real Estate Services (In re Bogdan), 414
F.3d 507, 512-13 (4th Cir. 2005)). In Bodgan, the debtor operated a limited liability
company that defrauded mortgage lenders by obtaining undercollateralized loans on
homes in Baltimore by collaborating with corrupt appraisers, mortgage brokers, and
title insurance agents. The trustee brought suit against these accomplices seeking $1
million in actual damages and $500,000 in punitive damages. Id. at 509-10. Since the
number of mortgage companies was small, and likely their hope of achieving a recovery
from possibly insolvent defendants over such a small sum did not make litigation on
their part worthwhile, they were willing to assign the claims. A situation where
creditors will unanimously assign their claims and waive any individualized right to
recovery would likely rarely arise, and therefore this door left open by the court in
Mukamal is not of much import.
311 Mukamal v. Bakes, 378 F. App’x. 890, 899 (11th Cir. 2010).
312 One potential issue is the first tenet of Caplin: the issue of statutory
authority. Bankruptcy trustees in Chapter 11 cases can claim, perhaps weakly, that
the Bankruptcy Code offers them flexibility in devising a Chapter 11 plan. See 11
U.S.C. § 1123 (2012). This authority has been called into question though. See Morris,
supra note 20, at 600-02.
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same complaints as he did in his capacity as the SIPA trustee
with precisely the same purpose, albeit this time as the
managing member of a limited liability company. This time, the
Second Circuit’s holding, grounded in the doctrine of in pari delicto
and the holding of Caplin, fall to the wayside, and Picard need not
parse the language of SIPA for an alternate basis of standing.313
IV.

IMPROVING LITIGATION TRUSTS

Litigation trusts are remarkably similar to class action
lawsuits: one party brings suit, a judgment will bind many nonparties, and the proceeds of the judgment will be distributed to
those non-parties. As discussed in Part II, when non-parties
are bound by litigation in the class action context, procedural
protections exist to ensure that they are adequately
represented.314 This part will draw on Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 to provide suggestions for ensuring that litigation
trusts adequately represent estate creditors.
First, estate creditors should receive notice of a trustee’s
intent to create a litigation trust. While such notice is likely
already contained in the debtor’s disclosure statement and
Chapter 11 plan, neither of these documents has a reputation
for being concise or accessible to a lay reader. In providing
creditors with such notice, Rule 23(c)(2)(B) should be
instructive. This provision requires that class action claimants
get notice of the nature of the action, including such things as
the proposed class, the claims, issues, and defenses, and the
binding effect that a class action judgment will have on them.315
In short, creditors should understand that they can bring their
own claims against culpable third parties, but that they are
giving up this claim in exchange for a pro rata distribution, less
administrative expenses, of what the trustee will recover.
Second, estate creditors should have the ability to opt
out of litigation trusts. The right to opt out, and the
consequences of opting out, should also be specified in the
notice creditors receive.316
Third, litigation trusts should ensure that creditors
receive a recovery similar to what they would have received
had they brought the claim themselves. In a case where such
claims exist, there will be two types of creditors: those who hold
claims against third parties for the losses they suffered, and
313
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For a description of the Second Circuit’s holding, see supra Part I.D.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
Class action claimants require similar notice. FED. R. CIV. P. (c)(2)(B)(v).
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those who do not. As discussed in Part II, a litigation trustee
should ensure that the trust does not distribute funds obtained
from assigned claims to creditors that did not possess such
claims. But efforts should be made to ensure that creditors
with claims against third parties are not subsidized by
creditors who do not possess such claims.
To illustrate this point, consider a Ponzi scheme that
collapses and leaves four creditors. The first was duped into
investing by the scheme’s principal, the second invested on the
recommendation of a reckless financial advisor, the third
invested on the basis of financial statements negligently
produced by the schemer’s accountant, and the fourth is the
schemer’s landlord. The debtor owes $1 million to each of these
four creditors. Assume further that the trustee seizes the
schemer’s personal assets, say houses and cars, and generates
$2 million in proceeds. Each creditor gets his pro rata share,
$500,000, and a litigation trust is created to seek $1 million in
damages against the financial advisor and the accountant.
As discussed in Part II, the litigation trust cannot
distribute money obtained through settlements with the
accountant and financial advisor to the landlord creditor or the
creditor who invested through the schemer; these causes of
action belong to the other two creditors and allocating the
proceeds to others would deny them adequate representation.
The litigation trust also cannot seek out more than $1 million in
damages; the assigned claims can be no greater than the harm
each creditor suffered, and here, each of the two creditors is out
only $500,000 after the estate’s initial distribution. Resultantly,
in a best case scenario, the two creditors with claims against
third parties will get paid in full on their claims, whereas the
other two creditors will only get a 50% distribution.
However, if in this hypothetical the accountant and
financial advisor each had $1 million, settlements with them
could have paid the two assigned claims in full, leaving the $2
million in estate assets to satisfy the claims of the third
investor and the landlord. In an ideal solution, the bankruptcy
estate would withhold distribution to creditors assigning claims
against third parties until a distribution on the assigned claims
could be made. This in turn would maximize the distribution
made to all creditors, and not just those creditors who hold
additional claims against third parties.317

317 This hypo seems to illustrate the point made in Caplin that the claims that
the litigation trust will sue on will be the difference between what the creditor lost in
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Fourth, the claims of litigation trusts should be capped
at the damages suffered by creditors who assigned claims to it.
This means that no distributions from the trust should be
made to non-assigning estate creditors, and that Moore v.
Bay318 should not become the rule with litigation trusts.319
Fifth, the interests of the creditors who have assigned
claims to the trust should be aligned. For example, in Crescent
Resources Litigation Trust ex rel. Bensimon v. Duke Energy
Corp., a land developer called Crescent Resources engaged in a
leveraged buyout in 2006.320 Lenders advanced it over one
billion in secured loans and this money was distributed to
Crescent’s parent corporation.321 The loans left Crescent
insolvent and it filed for bankruptcy in 2009.322 In the case of a
leveraged buyout bankruptcy, it is common for trustees to move
to vacate the liens secured creditors obtained as fraudulent
conveyances.323 However, in this case, the litigation trust,
which was for the benefit of $279 million in general unsecured
creditors and $961 million in claims constituting the unsecured
portion of the secured lenders’ claims, fully released the
secured lenders from liability.324 The litigation trust’s attempts
to pursue the former equity holders of Crescent who received
the proceeds of the secured loans were predictably
unsuccessful.325 In the context of dismissing a similar
fraudulent conveyance claim against the former equity holders,
the court noted the unjust release provision.326
Sixth, the litigation trust should provide, as Rule 23(e)
does, that before the trust enters into any settlement, that
settlement is reviewed to ensure that it is fair and reasonable.327

the bankruptcy and what the estate was distributed. Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace
Trust Co. of NY, 406 U.S. 416, 431 (1972).
318 284 U.S. 4 (1931).
319 Moore holds that if a fraudulent transfer is void as to one creditor, it is void
as to all creditors, and all creditors can share in the proceeds. David Gray Carlson,
Bankruptcy’s Organizing Principle, 26 FLA. ST. L. REV. 549, 580 (1999).
320 500 B.R. 464, 467-68 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2013).
321 Id.
322 Id. at 469.
323 See, e.g., In re Tribune Co., 464 B.R. 126 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011); In re Bay
Plastics, Inc., 187 B.R. 315 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995).
324 Crescent Resources, 500 B.R. at 469.
325 Id. at 471-77. As the opinion explains in depth, 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) (2012)
bars such suits.
326 Id. at 482. It would seem that the secured lenders, by acquiring ownership of
the debtor through the bankruptcy proceeding, appear to have used the litigation trust to
coax unsecured creditors into waiving viable claims against the secured lenders in exchange
for assistance in pursuing unviable claims against the former equity holders.
327 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).
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Litigation trusts could also provide that if creditors are
dissatisfied with the settlement, they are permitted to opt out.328
Because creditors are assigning viable claims to a
bankruptcy trustee through the bankruptcy plan confirmation
process and will be bound by any judgments or settlements
obtained by that trustee, procedural protections should exist to
ensure that these creditors receive adequate representation,
and through that due process.
CONCLUSION
Those who invest in Ponzi schemes often have pitiful
tales; lured into investing their life savings by a fictitiously safe
investment, they are often left with nothing to fend for
themselves in retirement. The discovery that there were
persons out there that knew of the scheme and could have either
limited its impact or prematurely terminated it yet chose to enable
and profit from it would certainly be frustrating. One can certainly
imagine a knee-jerk reaction toward imposing the losses suffered
by the victims onto the negligent or reckless third parties.
This note argues that while it may ultimately prove
worthwhile to impose creditor losses on culpable third parties,
steps must be taken to ensure that their interests are
adequately protected. It is possible that Title 11, which as
currently drafted did not envision providing the underpinning
for such suits, does not sufficiently protect all creditors. Until
these issues are resolved legislatively, courts should hesitate to
allow bankruptcy trustees to create ad hoc class action suits
solely through the protections offered by the voting procedures
of the plan confirmation process. Instead, courts should look to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 to ensure that creditors with
claims against third parties are adequately represented.
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